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Preface
In datacenters, e-commerce services and cloud computing services are deployed for customers, ac-
commodating hundreds and thousands of computers. CPU power consumption and cooling systems
take more than half of a datacenter’s power consumption. Thus, building highly e cient datacenters
is a significant challenge. In recent years, the growth of network interface speed is increasing, while
the growth of CPU performance is leveling o↵. This gap would be increasing continuously. That
is, network-based applications would be CPU bound for more performance. To solve this, field pro-
grammable gate arrays (FPGA) based solutions and in-kernel/kernel bypassing solutions have been
explored over the last five years. Traditionally, cache hierarchy has been installed and has been stud-
ied when we faced the gap between CPU and memory. Thus, this thesis discusses cache hierarchy
for network-based application, where a cache is built in both network interface card (NIC) and net-
work protocol stack as network data path. Key players start to deploy FPGAs in their datacenters to
accelerate their services and to achieve high energy e ciency. In these five years, key-value store
acceleration using an FPGA has been actively studied.
This dissertation explores cache hierarchy on network-based applications. There are a variety
of design options such as write policy, eviction policy, inclusive cache vs. non-inclusive cache and
so on. The designs are implemented on the NetFPGA platform and its performance is measured
and analyzed. Furthermore, this thesis shows the memcached, one of key-value stores, architecture
for an FPGA equipped with NIC. The FPGA card has two types of store regions: an on-chip RAM
and on-board o↵-chip DRAM modules. The proposed architecture consists of the first level cache
with on-chip RAM and the second level cache with on-board DRAM modules. This thesis shows
practical performance results using this NIC, compared with an existing hardware-based memcached
and software. Latency, throughput and power consumption are drastically improved, compared to the
existing systems.
This hardware solution is applied to distributed denial of service attack (DDoS) as a practi-
cal case, since recently DDoS amplification attack tra c has critically increased. An ICMP-based
DDoS detection scheme is proposed to fit with key-value store. This thesis conducts an experimental
evaluation and shows the feasibility.
Thoughout this dissertation, in-NIC cache, in-kernel cache and cache hierarchy are studied for a
network-based application. It is demonstrated that multi-layer key-value cache architectures will be
helpful to bridge speed gap between the growth of CPU performance and of network performance.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
A datacenter serves cloud computing and e-commerce services with accommodating hundreds of
thousands of computers, which consume a lot of power due to CPU and cooling systems, for the pur-
pose of satisfying customers requirements. In the article [2], CPU and cooling systems took up half
of all power consumption in a datacenter. In 2015, Microsoft started to operate a field programmable
gate array (FPGA) in their datacenters in order to accelerate their search engine system Bing, the
Catapult project [3]. They achieved high energy e ciency by using an FPGA. In addition, Amazon
AWS provides F1 instances serving FPGA logic cells to their customers in a cloud computing envi-
ronment [4]. An FPGA, therefore, has been considered to reduce power consumption and to improve
the performance of their applications.
In a datacenter, a variety of network services are served. A representative one of them is key-
value store. Key-value store is commonly used as a cache and storage of online services such as
e-commerce and social networking services, mostly running in cloud computing environments [5].
For the purpose of performance improvement [6], key-value store deployments in datacenters are
often scaled-out, leading in turn to increased power consumption. Thus, this dissertation focuses on
key-value store as a network service running in a datacenter.
S1 - Yahoo! Sherpa database platform system measurements, version 1.0 (33 K)The growth of
network interface speed is increasing, e.g., to 100GbE and 400GbE. On the other hand, the growth
of CPU performance is holding steady due to recent slowdown of Moore’s law. Applications along
with network processing would be CPU bound due to this limitation because it cannot be expected
that CPU performance would be improved to satisfy further network speed. Traditionally, to solve
the speed gap problem, cache hierarchy has been used in the case of the speed gap between CPU and
memory. We had faced the “memory wall” problem [7] where CPU and memory have both unbalance
performance and speed. Therefore, CPU cache hierarchy [8] has been studied and installed into
computer architecture. At the beginning of CPU, CPU and memory did not have a significant speed
gap. Thus, CPU had access to DRAM directly until the speed gap became conspicuous. Due to
1
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Figure 1.1: Typical CPU cache hierarchy.
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Figure 1.2: Network-based cache hierarchy.
miniaturization of transistors and evolution of microprocessor, we, however, faced a memory wall
where speeds of CPU and memory do not match, resulting in installing cache hiearchy on current
microprocessor architecture as shown in Figure 1.1.
In client-server model, both a client machine and a server machine need to process network-
ing. As mentioned above, the gap between network interface speed and CPU performance would
be increasing. Considering FPGA trends, network-based cache hierarchy using FPGA-based NIC
equipped with DRAM modules can be considered as shown in Figure 1.2. Similar to CPU cache or-
ganization, various design options could be considerable, e.g., write policy, inclusive or non-inclusive
and eviction policy, etc.
In this dissertation, network-based cache hierarchy is proposed and design options are explored
for building cache organization of FPGA-based NIC. This thesis also shows a concrete key-value
store architecture on FPGA integrated with the NetFPGA platform [9], which is an open source
platform for prototyping network devices. Finally, this thesis introduces a practical application,
DDoS mitigation, one of the important Internet security issue.
1.2 Objective
In this dissertation, the research objective is to explore the design space on multi-layer key-value store
combining in-NIC cache design and in-kernel and to improve performance and energy e ciency of
key-value store. To bridge the speed gap between CPU and network interfaces, an FPGA- based key-
value store acceleration and software optimization which use kernel-bypassing approach to remove
overhead of network processing on CPU and is used for building a cache on kernel have been studied.
An FPGA-based key-value store acceleration is built on an add-in card with PCI express as an
interface with a host machine or an FPGA board. Due to the physical size of an add-in card and the
limitation of FPGA’s I/O pins for di↵erential signals, DRAM modules which could be assembled
2
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is limited. That is, cache capacity on FPGA board is small, compared with general key-value store
running on a host. Regarding the energy e ciency, an FPGA-based key-value store acceleration is
higher than CPU-based key-value store.
On the other hand, in-kernel key-value store and kernel-bypassing key-value store remove the
bottleneck of CPU bound, especially, at the network protocol stack. These key-value stores utilize
large main memory on a motherboard as a cache. Since these approaches run on CPU, they would
lead to high power consumption. That is, it is hard to reduce power consumption rather than FPGA-
based approach.
Hence, an FPGA-based key-value store and in-kernel key-value store are a trade-o↵ concerning
cache capacity and power e ciency. Similar to cache hierarchy on CPU, cache hierarchy for a
network-based application can be considerable — an FPGA-based key-value store as the first level
cache (L1 cache) and in-kernel key-value store as second level cache (L2 cache). To design cache
hierarchy based on network datapath, various cache design options could be possible. Through this
dissertation, design options for network-based application and FPGA-NIC design along with a key-
value store processing core are explored.
1.3 Contributions
To address this issue, we introduce multi-layer key-value cache architecture, which is a networked
system for high energy e ciency in a datacenter. First of all, we introduce a concept of multi-
layer key-value cache architecture using FPGA-based in-NIC cache and in-kernel cache. As level
one cache (L1 cache), we use in-NIC cache leveraging on-board DRAM on an FPGA for a cached
media. As level two cache (L2 cache), we use in-kernel cache using host memory. In addition, we
explore the design options, similar to CPU cache hierarchy: write through vs. write back, cache
associativity and eviction policy, etc.
The second, we provide a concrete FPGA design using the NetFPGA platform for memcached,
one of key-value store deployments. Similar to the CPU, we built a first level cache on on-chip RAM
and a second level cache on on-board DRAM. When a query is hit on a cache of on-chip RAM, the
response can be handled without DRAM, so latency and performance can be improved. We provide
more information about design and performance analysis.
Finally, we adopt an FPGA-based key-value store acceleration to DDoS mitigation platform on
the Internet. We also propose a detection scheme and maintain fine-grain rules on key-value store.
We assume that we place it on the wire, thus mitigation hardware requires line-rate processing.
1.4 Thesis Organization
We introduce related work on in-NIC cache using an FPGA and in-kernel cache, including cases
which used kernel-bypassing acceleration, in Chapter 2. We show the relationship of each Chapter
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3-5, as shown in Figure 1.3. Chapter 3 proposes multi-layer key-value cache architecture, which is
a core proposal in this thesis. We also provide the detail of design options building the architec-
ture, which is our first contribution in this dissertation. Further, Chapter 4 focuses on in-NIC cache
design with hierarchy design combining on-chip RAM and on-board DRAM, which is the second
contribution. In this chapter, we take up in-NIC cache of the proposed multi-layer key-value cache ar-
chitecture described in Chapter 3, and introduce cache hierarchy inside in-NIC cache and the design.
Chapter 5 introduces the application case for DDoS mitigation, which is the third conribution. The
hardware-based key-value store described in Chapter 4 is applied to DDoS mitigation. We conclude
this dissertation in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 2
Related Work
The bottleneck on key-value store is considered to be the network protocol stack of the operating
system [10]. To solve this problem, two representative approaches have been proposed: hardware-
based key-value store acceleration and software-based key-value store acceleration. This chapter will
survey the related work: the detail and pros-and-cons on hardware-based key-value store acceleration
and software-based key-value store acceleration. Section 2.1 introduces key-value store and the
challenges for performance. Section 2.2 presents how an FPGA is used in two cases: industry and
academy to assist network protocol stack on kernel. To scale the performance of key-value store, the
remaing sections surveys the works realted to key-value store acceleration in aspects of hardware-
based and software-based acceleration. Section 2.3 introduces hardware-based key-value store and
Section 2.4 introduces software-based key-value store. Section 2.5 shows the hierarchy key-value
store design which uses di↵erent storage devices.
2.1 Key-value Store
Key-value store is one of Not only SQL (NOSQL) databases [11]. NOSQL database compensate
the disadvantages of RDBMS (e.g., transaction is supported in RDBMS). NOSQL databases have
simple data structure, which some databases have schemaless. Some NOSQL databases sacrifice
consistency in order to distribute queries to machines.
Key-value store traditionally is used for web cache and web application’s backend storage in an
aspect of simple API and scalability using consistent hashing, compared with RDBMS (Relational
DataBase Management System) [12]. Key-value store writes key-and-value pairs on host’s main
memory or storage such as SSD and HDD. Simple APIs consist of primitive GET(key), SET(key,
value) and DELETE(key), issuing a read request, a write request, and a delete (writing zero) request
respectively. Key-value store calculates a hash value of its key to retrieve the descriptor on hash table
entries when key-value store receives a query. Generally, a hash function (e.g., lookup3 [13, 14],
md5, cityhash [15]) is used for hash calculation. Hash table contains arrays of a data structure which
holds the descriptor to the key-value data. When key-value store identifies the requested key from
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the table, the paired value with the key is returned to the client.
The survey from [16] described that memcached which is on e of key-value store implementa-
tion is CPU-demanding application. Further, it reported that CPU utilization from 55% to 85% takes
Linux network stack. Rosenblum, et al also indicates that GET request of memcached latency anal-
ysis shows memcached’s user application processing time is around 7% [10, 17]. From this surveys,
key-value store processing is CPU-demanding application, which especially taking Linux network
protocol stack. Silver bullets for these problem is taking an dedicated hardware (e.g., FPGA and
ASIC) and software optimzing (e.g., Intel DPDK and netmap).
2.2 An FPGA
A common and promising approach to significantly improve the energy e ciency of key-value store
is to replace a part of the software with an application specific custom hardware. To build such custom
hardware, recently, FPGAs have been widely deployed for datacenter applications [10,13,14,18–25],
due to the reconfigurability, low power consumption, and a wide set of IP cores and I/O interfaces
supported.
2.2.1 Use Cases in Industry
Microsoft started to integrate FPGA in their datacenter to accelerate their search engine and cloud
computing services as Catapult project in 2015 [3]. Microsoft Bing serves web search engine to
customers and embedded an FPGA into a server to accelerate ranking stack [18]. This was the first
attempt to deploy FPGAs in a datacenter. Microsoft then accelerated their cloud computing platform,
Azure [26]. In Azure, the SmartNIC equipped with an FPGA is used as a network interface card.
SmartNIC has some acceleration functions related to networking. Amazon AWS provides FPGAs
on virtual machines(EC2 instance) as F1 instance [4]. Customers can easily develop a service with
an FPGA via PCI express to accelerate an application by using “FPGA Developer AMI (Amazon
Machine Image)” and “Hardware Development Kit”. One virtual machine instance is able to utilize
up to eight FPGAs.
2.2.2 Use Cases in Accademia
NetFPGA project [9] has developed a networking platform under an open source license. NetFPGA
project released two types of FPGA boards equipped with 10GbE connection. The one is NetFPGA-
10G. An FPGA device used is Xilinx Virtex-5 XC5VTX240T. Four 10GbE network interfaces are
used for communication. 288MB RLDRAM-II memory and three x36 QDR II memory are available.
Another FPGA board is NetFPGA SUME [27] as next generation model of NetFPGA-10G. NetF-
PGA SUME card is equipped with four SFP+ ports, 8GB DDR3 DRAMmodules, three x36 72Mbits
QDR II SRAM, PCI Express Gen3 x8, and Xilinx Virtex-7 690T FPGA. Since NetFPGA project
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Table 2.1: Summary of in-NIC processing approaches.
Ref. Type Platform Storage Parallelism
[10] Standalone FPGA+1GbE NIC DRAM Two cores
[19] Standalone Dedicated SoC Host DRAM Single accelerator is depicted
[14, 20] Standalone FPGA+10GbE NIC DRAM Deep pipeline
[25] Standalone FPGA+10GbE NIC DRAM+SSD Deep pipeline
[29] NIC+host FPGA+40GbE Host Memory Fully pipelined
Proposed Cache FPGA+10GbE NIC DRAM Many cores (crossbar connected)
provides reference switch, reference NIC and reference router design for targetting each board, re-
searchers can develop custom hardware based on these reference designs under the license.
For further network interface card (e.g., 40GbE, 100GbE), since memory and CPU processing
overhead is ine cent, FlexNIC [28] was developed to acheive e cient packet transferring on DMA.
Moving applications from userland to NIC achieves high throughput and low latency. FlexNIC was
used for a variety of applications for functionalities: key-value store. apache storm and intrusion
detection.
2.3 Hardware-based Key-value Store Acceleration
Table 2.1 summarizes the above-mentioned existing designs and our L1 cache design of the multi-
layer key-value cache. The existing designs can be used as a standalone key-value store and the
combination of a host and FPGA-NIC, while dedicated hardware as an L1 cache of the proposed
multi-layer key-value cache is used in this thesis. Since complete key-value servers are assumed to
be running on an application layer, dedicated hardware is operated just as an L1 cache and sophis-
ticated functionalities (e.g., logging, error handling, and data replication) can be left to the software
key-value servers. In the existing designs, GET requests are processed by dedicated hardwares,
while SET requests are processed by software or hardware, depending on how complicated memory
management is implemented.
A key application in datacenters is a distributed data store, such as memcached [30], used as a
large-scale data store and memory caching system. Because FPGA devices can be tightly coupled
with I/O subsystems, such as high-speed network interfaces [9, 27], their application to memcached
has been extensively studied recently [10, 13, 14, 19–25, 31]. An experimental result in [14] shows
that an FPGA-based standalone (i.e., FPGA board only) memcached accelerator improves the perfor-
mance per Watt by 36.4x compared to an 8-core Intel Xeon processor. Even with a host, it improves
the performance per Watt by 15.2x. However, a serious limitation of such FPGA-based memcached
accelerators is that their cache capacity is limited by DRAM capacity mounted on the FPGA boards.
As a DRAM module typically has more than 200 I/O pins (e.g., 204 pins for DDR3 SO-DIMM
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package), the number of DRAM modules handled by a single FPGA cannot be increased easily, as
mentioned in [25]. As DRAM capacity for a host main memory is growing, the capacity gap between
host memory and FPGA-based NIC should be addressed.
This approach first appeared in [10], which proposed an FPGA-based standalone memcached
appliance that utilizes DDR2 memory modules and a 1GbE network interface on an FPGA board.
The memcached appliance consists of dedicated hardware modules. A network processing block
and a memcached application block with slab-based memory management modules for supporting
various data lengths. Both GET and SET requests are processed by the dedicated hardware modules.
It can be parallelized by duplicating the memcached appliance cores.
Another memcached accelerator is designed as a dedicated SoC in [19]. It leverages the hard-
ware prototype proposed in [10] for GET requests, while it relies on general-purpose embedded
processors for the remaining functionalities, such as memory allocation, key-value pair eviction and
replacement, logging, and error handling.
A notable FPGA-based standalone memcached accelerator was proposed in [14,20]. It leverages
DDR3 memory modules and a 10GbE network interface on an FPGA board. To fully exploit the
parallelism of memcached requests, the request parsing, hash table access, value store access, and
response formatting are pipelined deeply. GET requests are processed by the pipelined hardware,
while a host CPU assists with memory management functionalities required for SET requests. To
handle key collisions by hardware, up to eight keys mapped to the same hash table index are looked
up in parallel (i.e., 8-way). Hash items with an expired timestamp in the same set are freed when they
are accessed for SET requests. Recently, this design is extended to support SATA3 SSDs in addition
to DRAM as storage [25] so that key-value pairs are stored in SSD or DRAM regions, depending on
the value length.
KV-Direct [29] demonstrated a SmartNIC achieving a high query rate (e.g., ⇠180Mqps), but was
limited to key-value store operations only, was a proprietary solution using 8B query size, batching
multiple queries in a single packet, and processing vector queries.
2.4 Software-based key-value store acceleration
In addition to such FPGA-based solutions, software-based optimizations have been studied to im-
prove the performance of data stores [15, 16, 32–36]. A latency breakdown of memcached reported
in [10] shows that a packet processing time for NIC and kernel network protocol stack is longer than
that spent in memcached software. Actually these software-based optimizations mainly focus on
how to reduce the processing time for kernel network protocol stack, and they can be classified into
two approaches: kernel bypassing and in-kernel processing.
8
2. Related Work
2.5. Hierarchical Key-value Store Design
2.4.1 Kernel-bypassing Approach
One solution to the bottleneck in the network stack is a kernel-bypassing approach. Luigi Rizzo
developed netmap [37], which is packet I/O framework using kernel bypassing to reduce overhead
on network protocol stack of an operating system. In the netmap framework, Ethernet device driver
passes a packet to netmap ring bu↵er to access userland application without any specialized hard-
ware. However, network processing is needed on userland application to develop netmap-based
application. Intel DPDK (Data Plane Development Kit) framework is a library feature which packets
can access userland application directly and are processed on a specific core, resulting in achieving
high performance.
To improve the throughput of key-value store, a holistic approach that includes the parallel data
access, network access, and data structure design was proposed in [15]. As the parallel data access,
data are partitioned and a single CPU core exclusively accesses a partition. As the network access,
Intel DPDK is used so that the server software can directly access NIC by bypassing the network
protocol stack to minimize the packet I/O overhead. As the data structure design, di↵erent data
structures are proposed for the cache and store modes. The network access optimization (e.g., kernel
bypassing) is mainly taken into account in this thesis. The other optimizations are orthogonal to the
multilevel NOSQL cache and can be applied for further e ciency.
2.4.2 In-kernel Approach
Another solution to the bottleneck is to build an application cache within kernel stack directly in
order to reduce overhead on the network protocol stack.
As proposed in [16], moving the key-value store into the OS kernel is an alternative approach
to remove most of the overhead associated with the network stack and system calls. In a kernel
layer, received packets are hooked by Netfilter framework [38], and only key-value store queries are
retrieved. The retrieved queries are processed inside the kernel with an in-kernel hash table. The
response packet is generated and sent back to the device driver. The received sk_bu↵ is reused for
the response to reduce memory copies in the kernel.
In the proposed multi-layer key-value cache architecture, since in this work complete key-value
servers are assumed to be running on an application layer and thus sophisticated functionalities, such
as data replication, are left to the key-value servers, the in-kernel cache approach is embedded as
an L2 cache in the proposed key-value cache hierarchy. The L2 cache design will be illustrated in
Section 3.5.
2.5 Hierarchical Key-value Store Design
In 2018, hierarchical key-value store design appeared in [39]. They built a cache organization on a
host CPU with NVM. Specifically, they use DRAM, NVM, and TCL Flash as the level one cache, the
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level two cache and main storage, respectively. Recent NVM serves persistent storage with middle
latency and middle capacity between DRAM and Flash. Di↵erent from this approach, this thesis
focuses on network datapath.
2.6 Summary
This chapter surveyed FPGA-based key-value store acceleration and software-based key-value store
acceleration and showed that there are trade-o↵s in terms of cache capacity and power e ciency.
The following chapter introduces the proposed multi-layer key-value cache architecture combining
FPGA-based and software-based acceleration to complement their disadvantages and to bridge net-
work speed and CPU performance speed.
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This chapter introduces multi-layer key-value cache architecture. Section 3.1 provides an overall
view of cache hierarchy concept. Section 3.2 introduces design options to building the proposed
multi-layer key-value cache architecture. Section 3.3 and Section 3.4 show details of L1 key-value
cache and L2 key-value cache, respectively. Section 3.5 shows a simple implementation for a proof
of concept. In addition, a simulator is built for each design option and evaluates them in Section 3.6.
Lastly, this chapter is summarized in Section 3.7
3.1 Key-value Cache Hierarchy
This section introduces a multi-layer key-value cache architecture combining in-NIC and in-kernel
cache, which is the main contribution in this dissertation. Figure 3.1 illustrates our multi-layer key-
value cache architecture that complementally combines the in-NIC and in-kernel caches in order
to fully exploit the highly energy-e cient in-NIC processing, while addressing the capacity limita-
tion by the in-kernel cache that utilizes a huge host main memory. It is assumed that one or more
key-value databases, such as key-value store, column-oriented store, document-oriented store, and
graph database, are running as software servers on a machine, where FPGA-based network inter-
faces (FPGA NICs) are mounted for receiving and responding key-value queries. On-board DRAM
capacity of the FPGA NICs is used as the L1 key-value cache, while a host main memory allocated
by the kernel module is used as the L2 key-value cache.
When the FPGA NIC receives a packet, the received packet header is parsed, and if it is a key-
value query, it is processed inside the FPGA NIC; otherwise, it is transferred to an Ethernet device
driver as well as common TCP/IP packets. For key-value queries, a key-value pair is extracted from
the packet and the corresponding key is looked up from a hash table in the FPGA NIC. If the key
is found in the hash table, the value stored in the on-board DRAM is returned to the requestor (i.e.,
L1 key-value cache hit); otherwise, it is transferred to an Ethernet device driver as well as common
TCP/IP packets (i.e., L1 key-value cache miss).
In the Ethernet device driver of our L2 key-value cache, the received packet header is examined
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Figure 3.1: Relationship between L1 and L2 key-value caches.
again, and if it is a key-value query, it is processed inside the in-kernel cache module; otherwise, it is
transferred to a standard network protocol stack as well as common packets. For key-value queries, a
key-value pair is extracted from the packet and the corresponding key is looked up from a hash table
in the in-kernel cache. If the key is found in the hash table, the value stored in the in-kernel cache
is returned to the requestor (i.e., L2 key-value cache hit); otherwise it is transferred to a network
protocol stack as usual (i.e., L2 key-value cache miss). In the case of L2 key-value cache miss, the
key-value query is transferred to an application layer and processed by a corresponding key-value
software server.
Similar to CPU cache hierarchy, there are a variety of design options to build multi-layer caches.
Here, we re-visit design options in CPU cache and memory management system used in general
opearation systems.
1. Cache write policies between L1 and L2 caches
To update cache, there are two ways for cache: write-through and write-back. Generally, write-
through is writing data from CPU is updating to both cache and memory. An advantage is that
data consistency is kept since the contents on both cache and memory always correspond.
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Meanwhile, write-back can write only cache then, data is returned back to memory later. An
advantage is high availability of cache management, compared with write-through. Drawbacks
are keeping consistency, which is di cult to identify the inconsistency data and to control the
data to keep consistency.
2. Cache associativities
To map memory, contents on cache has mainly three ways: direct map, set-accosiative, and
full-associative. Direct map is that cache line is determined by memory address. Advantages
are that developing cost is cheap and the replacement algorithm is simple. Set-associative
cache is that N-way data is stored per memory address. Set-associative needs to select which
data should be chosen. In addition, if data is needed to be replaced, the one of N-ways must
be selected. Against this replacement, an algorithm could be FIFO, LRU, and RANDOM.
Full-associative cache is not accessed by the pointer. All cache lines are retrieved. Hit ratio
can be improved. However, design cost is high and the design itself is complicated.
3. Inclusion policies between L1 and L2 caches
The content of cache and memory could be shared or not-shared: inclusive policy and non-
inclusive policy. In inclusive policy, the memory contains cache contents, whereas memory
excludes cache contents in non-inclusive policy. Therefore, when replacement happens on
cache, the data removed from cache and the data is transferred to memory. This function takes
development cost for the building. Meanwhile, inclusion policy is a simple way in an aspect
of building cache.
4. Cache eviction policies on L1 cache
Eviction policy happens when set-associative cache is used and the cache is needed to be re-
placed. Representative algorithms are LRU, Random, and FIFO. LRU (Least Recently Used)
is that the data which is not used the most frequently, is replaced of N-ways. Random al-
gorithm chooses one of N-ways to replace with random algorithm. FIFO (First-in, first out)
algorithm evicts the firstly accessed data of N-ways.
5. Memory management
Generally, key-value store uses slab allocator or log-structured merged-tree as a memory man-
agement mechanism. Slab allocation is utilized on kernel’s memory management in addition
to memcached. (e.g., Linux, FreeBSD, and HP-UX). Log-structure merged-tree is used for
database systems. This memory management takes inserting operation for write. Since ran-
dom access is not used, this write scheme is faster. Inserting operation takes O(1) on avarage,
but find-min takes O(N) on avarage. Therefore, LSM-tree is suitable for a write-intensive
application. This memory management is used general key-value store (e.g., LevelDB and
RocketDB).
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3.2 Design Options in Multi-layer Key-value Caches
In this section, design options in multi-layer key-value caches are overviewed, based on the previous
section.
3.2.1 Write-Back vs. Write-Through
Cache write policy is an important design choice for multi-layer cache design. In the proposed multi-
layer key-value cache, write-back policy can reduce the tra c amount between L1 and L2 key-value
caches, because written data are not transferred from L1 to L2 key-value caches until modified (i.e.,
dirty) cache blocks in the L1 key-value cache are evicted. Although in write-back policy the cache
blocks in L1 key-value cache are not consistent with those in L2 key-value cache internally, such
inconsistency is never exposed to applications. In write-through policy, cache blocks in L2 key-value
cache are updated whenever those in L1 key-value cache are updated, and thus the tra c amount
between L1 and L2 key-value caches increases. The problem of such write-through policy is that
the write performance of L1 key-value cache is restricted by the L2 key-value cache bandwidth.
Section 3.6.2 will evaluate the write-back and write-through policies.
3.2.2 Cache Associativities on Hash Table
As illustrated in Section 3.3, to access cached key-value data in value store, the key is hashed to
compute the index in the hash table where a start address of the cached key-value data in Value Store
is stored. There is a possibility that di↵erent keys generate an identical hash value, but only one of
them can be stored in hash table and the others will be evicted. Such a situation is called a hash
conflict.
To avoid hash conflicts and key-value cache misses, we can increase the associativity of hash
table. More specifically, in the n-way set associative hash table, up to n di↵erent keys whose hashed
values are identical can be stored in hash table. As the number of ways increases, L1 key-value
cache misses due to the hash table conflicts are typically decreased. For example, an 8-way hash
table is used in Xilinx’s FPGA memcached appliance to avoid the hash conflicts [14]. Note that in
the proposed design the key length assumed is variable and if the key is too long to be stored in a
single hash table entry, the key is stored using multiple hash table entries. In this design, a key with
up to 64B size can be stored in a single hash table entry. A key larger than 64B is stored in multiple
hash table entries. Section 3.6.3 will evaluate the set-associative design of hash table in terms of L1
key-value cache miss ratio.
3.2.3 Inclusion vs. Non-Inclusion
Inclusion policy (e.g., inclusive or non-inclusive) is an important design choice for multi-layer
caches. When the proposed L1 and L2 key-value caches are inclusive, cached data in L1 key-value
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cache are guaranteed to be in L2 key-value cache. When they are non-inclusive, cached data are
guaranteed to be in at most one of L1 and L2 key-value caches.
Non-inclusive policy has an advantage in terms of cache e ciency especially when L1 key-value
cache size is comparable to that of L2 key-value cache, while inclusive policy is simple to implement,
as illustrated below.
• Assuming that a GET query is missed at L1 key-value cache and hit at L2 key-value cache, if
non-inclusive policy is enforced, the cached block in L2 key-value cache is transferred to L1
key-value cache and then the cached block in L2 is deleted. If inclusive policy is enforced in
the same situation, the cached block in L2 is not deleted.
• Assuming that an unmodified cached data in L1 key-value cache is evicted, if non-inclusive
policy is enforced, the cached data in L1 key-value cache is transferred to L2 key-value cache
and then the original cached block in L1 is deleted. If inclusive policy is enforced in the same
situation, we do not have to copy the cached block in L1 to L2.
• Assuming that a query is missed at both L1 and L2 key-value caches, if inclusive policy is
enforced, the requested data retrieved from key-value server are required to be cached in both
L1 and L2 key-value caches. This behavior can be easily implemented, because the requested
value retrieved from key-value store server is naturally transferred to the client machine via
Ethernet device driver (i.e., L2 key-value cache) and FPGA NIC (i.e., L1 key-value cache).
Non-inclusive policy is advantageous in terms of cache e ciency, while inclusive policy is simple
to implement in L1 key-value cache. However, inclusive policy increases the tra c between L1 and
L2 key-value caches, which may degrade the throughput. Section 3.6.4 will evaluate the inclusive
and non-inclusive policies in terms of total cache miss ratio when L1 and L2 key-value cache sizes
are varied.
3.2.4 Eviction Policies on Hash Table
Section 3.2.2 introduced set associativities on hash table design to reduce L1 key-value cache misses
due to hash conflicts. By building multiple ways for hash table, multiple key-value pairs whose
hashed keys are identical can be stored in hash table. Assuming that a new key-value pair is going to
be stored in Hash Table but all the ways are in use, one of existing ways in hash table will be replaced
with the new key-value pair. Eviction policy defines which way will be evicted in such situations.
Here we discuss the following three eviction policies.
• Random: One of the ways is randomly selected to be replaced with a new key-value pair. A
simple implementation without a random generator is that the hashed value of the new key-
value pair is used to select one of the ways to be evicted.
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• LRU: The least recently used way is selected to be evicted. The design complexity increases
when the number of ways is greater than two.
These eviction policies will be evaluated in terms of L1 key-value cache miss ratio in Section 3.6.5.
3.2.5 Slab Size Configurations in L1 key-value Cache
Section 3.1 introduced memory management scheme on key-value store: slab allocation and log-
structured merged-tree. For key-value store acceleration, slab allocation is selected for memory
management system since slab allocation is used as preallocation memory, hence, it is easy to utilize
it.
According to a memcached workload analysis [40], 90% of the requested data sizes are less than
1KB. The study shows that requested key-value sizes are mostly about 20B in USR workload, while
large values with up to 1MB are requested in ETC and APP workloads. As illustrated in Section 3.3,
in the proposed L1 key-value cache, a list of free memory blocks are preliminarily allocated for each
value size (e.g., 64B, 128B, 256B). The number of memory blocks preliminarily allocated for each
value size should be carefully selected. It can be further optimized if the workload is predictable so
that the majority of requested key-value data can be fit to the allocated memory blocks.
In this work, L1 key-value cache is implemented on an FPGA board. As L1 key-value cache
capacity is limited, allocating large memory blocks (e.g., 1MB blocks) may significantly reduce the
number of small-sized cache blocks and increases the L1 key-value cache miss ratio. Therefore, it
may be required to determine the upper limit of memory block sizes allocated. In this case, key-value
data larger than the upper limit are not cached in L1 key-value cache.
Section 3.6.6 will evaluate various configurations of sizes and the numbers of memory blocks
with memached traces in terms of L1 key-value cache miss ratio.
3.3 L1 Key-value Cache Architecture
Figures 3.2 and 3.3 show a datapath of the proposed L1 key-value cache implemented in an FPGA
NIC. Only packets with key-value queries (i.e., key-value packets) are extracted based on their ser-
vice destination port number and only key-value packets are transferred to dedicated PEs (e.g., PE1)
for hash table lookup. Other packets are transmitted to a host machine with a DMA controller via
PCI-Express. Thus, an arbiter is implemented in front of the DMA controller to arbitrate two input
sources: key-value tra c which are not hit in hash table (i.e., L1 key-value cache miss packets) and
non-key-value tra c.
L1 key-value cache stores key-value pairs in the on-board DRAMmodules equipped on an FPGA
board. The key and value parts are typically processed as variable-length data. As surveyed in Section
2.3, existing in-NIC key-value accelerators [14, 20] employ a single deep pipeline in which value
parts are processed as variable-length binary data. However, a wide diversity of value lengths (e.g.,
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Figure 3.2: L1 key-value cache hit on heterogeneous multi-PE design of L1 key-value cache.
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Figure 3.3: L1 key-value cache miss on heterogeneous multi-PE design of L1 key-value cache.
4B to 1MB) is observed in a memcached workload analysis [40]. In addition, a wide variety of value
types, such as, string, list, hash, set, and sorted set [41], are useful for practical applications. Their
processing cycles di↵er significantly depending on their value types. For example, the computational
complexity of processing a string-type value is O(1), while that for a list structure it is O(n), where n
is the number of items in the list. Thus, an optimized PE core is built for each value type, rather than
a single deep pipeline where various key-value pairs are uniformly processed. While these optimized
PE cores are simple and are not pipelined, the proposed design employs multiple instances of such
simple cores to exploit a high query-level parallelism.
Below are value-types supported in our L1 key-value cache. They are the same as those supported
in data structure server Redis [41].
• STRING: A variable-length value is stored as a string into a dynamically allocated free mem-
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Figure 3.4: key-value store PE core architecture.
ory block, called chunk.
• HASH: A value consists of multiple pairs of field and its value, both of which are STRING
type. These strings and their hashed values are stored as a table into a free chunk.
• SET: A value consists of a collection of unsorted strings. The collection of strings are stored
in a free chunk. Each string is aligned in a fixed-size block in a chunk.
• LIST: A value consists of a list of strings which are stored in a free chunk as well as those of
SET type. The proposed L1 key-value cache supports the list operations that insert and append
a new element to the list.
• SORTED SET: It is similar to SET type, but each string has its own score and strings are sorted
based on their score.
As shown in Figures 3.2 and 3.3, PE cores (mentioned above) are connected to a crossbar switch.
PE A nity module is in charge of packet classification. It receives packets from Ethernet MAC
(Media Access Control) and checks their destination port number. If the destination port number of a
received packet is matched to one of key-value service port numbers, PE A nity module passes the
packet to one of PEs which are currently idle. A DRAM controller is also connected to the crossbar
switch. It is accessed by the PE cores to read and write access hash table and value store in DRAM
modules on the FPGA NIC board.
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3.3.1 Processing Element (PE) Design
A prototype of an L1 key-value cache that consists of key-value store PE cores of the string type
is implemented. The PEs process SET and GET operations. The proposed design accepts variable-
length values, while the key length is fixed to 64B for simplicity. CRC32 is implemented as a hash
function. PEs and a DRAM controller are connected via a crossbar switch. A simple fixed-priority
arbiter is used for the crossbar switch. Data width of the crossbar is 128bit. UDP is employed as
a transport-layer protocol as it is simple and low-overhead. UDP is supported in memcached in
addition to TCP.
Figure 3.4 shows a block diagram of a string type key-value cache PE. Received key-value store
queries are passed to Fetch module and they are parsed as operation type (e.g., SET, GET, and
DELETE), key, and value. PacketFilter core extracts key-value packets from all the received pack-
ets. More specifically, packets with specific destination IP address and destination port number are
marked as key-value packets and transferred to the L1 key-value cache for key-value processing. The
other packets are simply transferred to a host machine via the DMA controller. The key-value queries
are first stored in a FIFO bu↵er and processed by one of multiple PE cores. In the GET operation,
the requested key is examined in the L1 key-value cache and if the requested key-value pair does
not exist in the cache, the request packet is passed to the crossbar switch and then transferred to the
host machine. If the requested key-value pair exists in the L1 key-value cache, the response packet
is generated by swapping the source/destination IP addresses and source/destination port numbers of
the original request packet and adding the requested value.
3.3.2 Memory Management
Memory management is in charge of allocating free memory chunks and freeing unused ones. For
example, a write request (e.g., SET operation) needs to allocate a free memory chunk in value store
to store the new value. Slab Allocator is employed for memory management in value store. Slab
Allocator manages fixed-length memory chunks of several sizes where values are stored, as shown
in Figure 3.5.
When it receives a SET query that stores a new value, an unused chuck with minimum size where
the new value can be fit is removed from the Free List and then used. Assuming, for example, a SET
query contains a 24B new value, Slab Allocator in Figure 3.5 allocates a 64B chunk to store the 24B
new value. Such a memory management is one of complicated functions when it is implemented
as a dedicated hardware. In the proposed L1 key-value cache, Slab Allocator is implemented as a
microcode running on a tiny soft-CPU processor in each PE core to access Free List of each chunk
size as shown in Table 3.1. The other options are using hard-macro CPU (e.g., Xilinx Zynq series)
and dedicated hardware implemeted by HDL. Since hard-macro CPU runs on further faster speed,
the performance of slab allocation can be improved. Chapter 4 shows further implementation for
higher performance and uses dedicated hardware for slab allocation.
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Table 3.1: Soft-macro CPU specification for slab allocator
CPU MIPS R3000 Compatible
Instruction and Data Width 32bit
RAM 32kB (cache-less)
Frequency 80MHz
Hash Table Entry (72 Bytes)
Value Pointer
(32 bits)
Key Length (16 bits)
Val Length (16 bits)
Flag (16 bits)
Reserved (16 bits)
Key (512 bits)
0x00
0x03
0x05
0x07
0x09
0x0A
0x47
64 Bytes chunk x 512k
128 Bytes chunk x 256k
256 Bytes chunk x 128k
512 Bytes chunk x 64k
Hash Table
Value Store
Value Store (slab)
On-board Memory
Figure 3.5: Hash Table and Value Store implemented on DRAM.
3.3.3 Hash Collision Handling
Figures 3.2 and 3.3 also illustrate its behavior of L1 key-value cache in the two cases where a
requested key is hit and missed on the hash table, respectively. hash table is used to store pairs of a
key and a start address of the chuck where the corresponding value is stored. A hashed value of a
key is used as an index (address) of the hash table. To read or write the chunks stored in value store,
a PE core performs the following steps.
1. An index in the hash table is calculated by hashing the requested key.
2. Content from the hash table is read based on the index. Then the requested key and the key
read from the hash table are compared.
3. If both the keys are identical, a value is read from the Value Store based on the start address
of the chunk (Figure 3.2). Otherwise, the requested key does not exist in the value store
(Figure 3.3).
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L1 key-value cache miss occurs when the hashed value of the requested key does not exist or it
is conflicted with that of the other keys. To mitigate the hash conflicts, set-associative design was
introduced in Section 3.2.2.
Various hardware-level NIC extensions, such as TCP o✏oading, checksum calculation, and Re-
ceive Side Scaling (RSS) supported in some commercial network adapters, are available for improv-
ing the network performance. Please note that the proposed L1 key-value cache is orthogonal to such
hardware-level NIC extensions and can be used with them for further e ciency.
3.3.4 Interconnection
In this system, each PE is connected with the crossbar switch to accelerate the performance by
parallelizing cores. Table 3.2 shows the specification of the crossbar switch used in this L1 key-value
cache.
Table 3.2: Crossbar switch specification
Data Width 128bit
Arbitration Fixed priority
Frequecy 160MHz
Figure 3.6 shows the frequency and occupancy when only crossbar switch is synthesized on an
FPGA (Xilinx Virtex-5 XC5VTX240T). It is assumed that each PE runs on 160MHz. The horizontal
line indicates 160MHz as a target frequency. This figure shows that when the number of PEs con-
nected with a crossbar switch is more than 30, the frequencies are below the target frequency. Slice
occupancy is below 6% to satisfy the frequenecy requirement (160MHz). As shown in this figure,
30 PEs can be connected with a crossbar switch in terms of slice utilization and frequency. Please
note that since this evaluation does not include PEs’ area, the number of PEs implemented would be
lower than expected.
3.4 L2 Key-value Cache Architecture
In [16], a key-value data store that uses a host memory as storage is implemented in Linux kernel
space. Key-value queries received by the kernel are hooked so that a customized handler is called
in order to process the key-value queries inside the kernel. Such in-kernel processing can improve
the key-value performance compared to the original user space implementation, because the network
protocol processing and related system calls can be eliminated. As a result, about 3.3Mops (operation
per second) performance in USR trace is achieved as reported in [16]. In the proposed multi-layer
key-value cache architecture, as an L2 key-value cache, a similar in-kernel cache is implemented in
Linux kernel using Netfilter framework.
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Figure 3.6: Maximum operating frequency and slice utilization vs. number of PEs connected to
crossbar switch.
3.5 System Implementation
In this section, a prototype implementation of the proposed multi-layer key-value cache is illus-
trated. Only the necessary functions of the L1 key-value cache are implemented to explore the design
choices. More specifically, multiple heterogeneous key-value cache PEs introduced in Section 3.3
are implemented in the L1 key-value cache.
3.5.1 Design Environment
Table 3.3 lists the design environment. The proposed L1 key-value cache is implemented on NetFPGA-
10G board by partially using the reference NIC design provided by NetFPGA Project [9]. Table 3.4
shows the hardware specification. FPGA device used is Xilinx Virtex-5 XC5VTX240T. A 10GbE
network interface is used for communication. hash table and value store in the L1 key-value cache
are implemented on a 288MB RLDRAM-II memory on the FPGA board 1. Design tool used is
Xilinx ISE 13.4.
1 The memory capacity of NetFPGA-10G board is very small, but newer FPGA boards have more capacity (e.g., 8GB
DDR3 SDRAM for NetFPGA-SUME).
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Table 3.3: L1 key-value cache design environment.
CPU Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-4460
Host memory 4GB
OS CentOS release 6.7
Kernel Linux kernel 2.6.32-504
NIC (FPGA) NetFPGA-10G
Table 3.4: Target FPGA board for L1 key-value cache.
Board NetFPGA-10G
FPGA Virtex-5 XC5VTX240T
DRAM 288MB RLDRAM-II
SRAM 27MB QDRII SRAM
PCIe PCIe Gen2 x8
Network I/O SFP+ x4
3.5.2 Implementation of L1 and L2 Key-value Caches
Slab Allocator is implemented as a microcode running on a MIPS R3000 compatible soft processor.
Free List is a list structure that manages unused memory chunks. It is initially implemented as Block
RAMs in the FPGA for simplicity, but it can be implemented using on-board SRAMs. When the
key-value cache PE executes a SET operation that requires a free memory chunk, it interrupts the
soft processor so that the Slab Allocator returns an unused chunk from Free List. In the case of a
DELETE operation, Slab Allocator seeks the corresponding chunk and appends it to Free List.
As L2 key-value cache, an in-kernel key-value cache is implemented as a loadable kernel module.
Netfilter framework is used to process key-value store packets in the kernel. That is, a customized
handler is called when the kernel receives the key-value queries, as illustrated in Section 3.4.
3.5.3 Area Evaluation
This section evaluates the FPGA area utilization of key-value cache PEs, which are used in L1 key-
value cache. Horizontal scalability that allows us to add more PEs depending on required perfor-
mance is an advantage of our heterogenous multi-PE design, where each PE is optimized for spe-
cific data types as illustrated in Section 3.3. The target device is Xilinx Virtex-5 XC5VTX240T on
NetFPGA-10G. Xilinx ISE 14.7 is used for design synthesis and implementation. SPEED mode is
selected as a synthesis option.
Figure 3.7 shows the slice utilization. “Reference NIC” shows the slice utilization for the stan-
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Table 3.5: L1 key-value cache throughput for four query types.
Query type Average throughput [Mops]
GET (HIT) 1.42354
GET (MISS) Determined by L2 key-value cache
SET (HIT) 2.20104
SET (MISS) 0.71049
dard 10GbE NIC functions that include four 10G MAC cores and a DMA controller for PCI-Express
Gen2 x8. “Key-value cache PE + Reference NIC” shows that for up to eleven PEs and an RL-
DRAM/DDR3 SDRAM controller in addition to Reference NIC. Each key-value cache PE has a
MIPS R3000 compatible processor and registers for storing key-value pairs. Up to eleven PEs can
be implemented on the Virtex-5 device.
3.5.4 Throughput
This section evaluates the query processing throughput of L1 key-value cache. On the client machine,
netmap-based [37] query injector that can fully utilize 10GbE bandwidth is used to generate queries.
The following four query types are used for the throughput evaluation. Each type has a key and a
value. Their lengths are fixed to 64B.
• “SET (HIT)” generates SET queries which are always hit in L1 key-value cache and modify
the cache.
• “SET (MISS)” generates SET queries which are always missed in L1 key-value cache 2. In
this case, memory allocation is performed for each query in L1 key-value cache and thus the
performance will be degraded.
• “GET (HIT)” generates GET queries which are always hit in L1 key-value cache by caching
the keys to be requested in L1 key-value beforehand. The key-value cache PE returns response
packets that contain the key-value pair requested in the GET queries to the client.
• “GET (MISS)” generates GET queries that never hit in L1 key-value cache. Such queries are
transferred to L2 key-value cache and processed. Thus, its throughput is determined by that of
L2 key-value cache rather than L1 key-value cache.
Table 3.5 shows average throughputs of the four query types on L1 key-value cache. Throughput
of “GET (HIT)” is 1.42Mops. Throughput of “SET (HIT)” is 2.20Mops, while that of “SET (MISS)”
is 0.71Mops because memory allocation on value store is performed for each query. In “SET (MISS)”
2We modified the FPGA logic of L1 key-value cache not to cache anything.
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case, a soft processor running on the PE executes a memory allocation which takes about 200 clock
cycles. The PE is stalled during the memory allocation, and thus the throughput is degraded.
The expected throughputs when assuming multiple PEs can be calculated. NetFPGA-10G board
is equipped with two RLDRAM-II modules and their aggregate throughput is 25.6Gbps3. Thus, the
memory bandwidth including the arbitration for the DRAM controller is not a major performance
bottleneck when a given workload is under 25.6Gbps. An expected aggregated throughput is calcu-
lated as
TTotal = min(TMem,TNet, n ⇥ TPE), (3.1)
where TMem, TNet, TPE , and n denote the memory bandwidth, network bandwidth, single PE per-
formance, and the number of PEs, respectively. TMem and TNet are set to 25.6Gbps and 10Gbps,
respectively. TPE is set based on Table 3.5. Figure 3.8 shows the calculation result. It shows that
10Gbps network bandwidth is a major source of the performance bottleneck on L1 key-value cache.
It also shows that seven PEs and nine PEs are required to achieve the 10Gbps GET and SET through-
put, respectively.
 0
 20
 40
 60
 80
 100
 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11
Sl
ice
 U
tili
za
tio
n 
[%
]
Number of PEs
KVS PE
NetFPGA Reference NIC
Figure 3.7: Area utilization on Virtex-5 XC5VTX240T.
3.6 Design Exploration on Key-value Cache Architecture
Various design options are available for the proposed multi-layer key-value cache architecture in
terms of the multilevel organizations and cache policies, as proposed in Section 3.1. This section will
quantitively explore the proposed design options by using a simulator with real memcached traces so
3Since we assume that RLDRAM controller runs with 160MHz as frequency and 128bit data bus, the throughput is up
to 25.6Gbps.
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Figure 3.8: Aggregated throughput with multiple key-value cache PEs on NetFPGA-10G.
that this thesis would be the first guideline to build the multi-layer key-value cache architecture that
utilizes the FPGA-based in-NIC cache and the in-kernel key-value cache.
3.6.1 Simulation Methodology
Thememcached traces were generated based on a memcached workload analysis results [40]. In [40],
the following five workload classes are analyzed in terms of operation types (e.g., GET, SET, and
DELETE) ratio, key size distribution, value size distribution, key appearance, and so on. These three
parameters were used to generate workload. To decide hit or miss in hash table, we referred only
key appearance, i.e., identification number. Key length and value length were used for calculating
throughput and slab allocation. Value contents were not utilized because the value contents are not
considered in this simulation.
• USR : Key sizes are 16B and 21B. Value sizes are 2B.
• SYS : Most key sizes are less than 30B. 70% of value sizes are around 500B.
• APP : 90% of key sizes are 31B. Value sizes are around 270B.
• ETC : Most key sizes are 20-40B. Small amount of values are very large (e.g., 1MB).
• VAR : Key sizes are 32B. 80% of value sizes are 50B.
The above-mentioned values were measured by us from graphs in [40] by hand. Please note that
these values may contain certain errors.
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3.6.2 Write-Through vs. Write-Back
There are two write policies between L1 and L2 key-value caches: write-through and write-back.
Here the DMA controller between L1 and L2 key-value caches is simulated in addition to these
caches. In the simulation, 10Gbps line rate queries based on the memcached traces are injected to
L1 and L2 key-value caches.
Figure 3.9 shows the simulation result. In VAR and SYS traces, there is a large gap between the
write-back and write-through policies. In VAR trace, more than 70% of queries are SET operations
that update the L1 key-value cache. SYS trace also contains a lot of SET operations (i.e., more than
30% of whole queries). Thus, write-through policy achieves a quite high throughput in VAR and
SYS traces, while the di↵erences between these two policies are not significant in the other traces.
The 10GbE and PCI-Express interfaces would limit the write throughput between these caches.
Theoretical DMA transfer capacity is 4GB/s and 7.69GB/s in PCI-Express Gen2 x8 and PCI-Express
Gen3 x8, respectively. A PCI-Express Gen3 x8 interface achieves 7.06GB/s throughput [42]. 10GbE
is assumed as a network I/O. In the graph, these 10GbE and PCI-Express bandwidth values are shown
as horizontal lines.
Although a performance gain of write-back may not be significant in the read-intensive workload,
write-back policy can reduce the DMA tra c in write-intensive workload. When assuming a 10GbE
network bandwidth, the DMA bandwidth between L1 and L2 key-value caches is a bottleneck when
write-through policy is used for VAR and SYS traces.
3.6.3 Cache Associativity
The multi-layer key-value caches were simulated by varying the set associativity N of the L1 key-
value cache, where N = 1, 2, 4, and 8. In all the cases, the total L1 key-value cache size is fixed to
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Figure 3.10: Cache miss ratio on set-associative L1 key-value cache.
92MB.
Figure 3.10 shows the simulation results, where X-axis shows the memcached trace and Y-axis
shows the L1 key-value cache miss ratio. In USR, SYS, and VAR traces, when N is varied from 2
to 8, the cache miss ratio is reduced by 2-7% compared to the direct mapped cache (i.e., N = 1). In
ETC trace, the associativity does not a↵ect the miss ratio due to less hash conflicts.
3.6.4 Inclusion vs. Non-inclusion
Here “L2/L1 capacity ratio” is defined as the ratio of the L2 key-value cache capacity against that of
L1 key-value cache (e.g., the ratio is two when L2 is twice larger than L1). We will discuss inclusion
and non-inclusion design options for L1 and L2 key-value caches when the L2/L1 capacity ratio is
varied. Figure 3.11 shows the simulation results of inclusion and non-inclusion options, where X-axis
shows the L2/L1 capacity ratio and Y-axis shows the cache miss ratio. When the capacity ratio is 1,
the non-inclusion option reduces the cache miss ratio by up to 15% compared to the inclusion. Please
note that inclusion option when the capacity ratio is 1 implicates the results with only L1 key-value
cache (no L2 key-value cache). In this case, the cache miss ratio is quite high (e.g., 75.8% and 52.1%
in USR and SYS, respectively), which demonstrates the necessity of our multi-layer key-value cache
design. When the capacity ratio is over 16, di↵erences between the inclusion and non-inclusion in
terms of cache miss ratio become quite small. Assuming L1 key-value capacity is 288MB and 8GB,
non-inclusion is an e cient option only when L2 key-value capacity is less than 4.6GB and 128GB,
respectively.
DRAM capacity of the FPGA board used in the experiments is 8GB. When the capacity of a host
main memory is less than 128GB, we can reduce the cache miss ratio by up to 10% by selecting
non-inclusion option compared to the inclusion option. In other cases, the selection of inclusion
and non-inclusion options does not a↵ect the cache miss ratio significantly. Regarding the L1 key-
value cache write policy, the inclusion policy assumes the write-through, while the non-inclusion
policy assumes the write-back. non-inclusion can reduce DMA tra c in some traces. Although non-
inclusion requires replacement of cache blocks, and so implementation cost is high. Thus in case
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Figure 3.11: Inclusive policy vs. non-inclusive policy.
of high bandwidth with PCI express, inclusion is recommended as a more straightforward design
should be adopted when we consider implementation cost.
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3.6.5 Eviction Policy
This section examines cache eviction policies in L1 key-value cache when the number of ways N
is more than one. In the simulations, the capacity of L1 key-value cache is set to 2M entries, and
eviction policies of Random and LRU are simulated. Figure 3.12 shows the simulation results of
these eviction policies in terms of cache miss ratio for five traces when the number of ways N is
varied from 2 to 8.
A visible improvement can be observed for each policy when N increases except for ETC trace
which contains a lot of DELETE operations. The result of LRU is not better than that of RANDOM.
Since hardware implementation of LRU is complicated, RANDOM is thus practical choice as the
cache eviction policy for L1 key-value cache.
3.6.6 Slab Configurations for L1 key-value Cache
The proposed L1 key-value cache supports variable-length keys and values. Regarding the keys, since
each hash table entry has a 64B memory space for key, keys larger than 64B are stored using multiple
Hash Table entries. Since value sizes di↵er significantly, we employ Slab Allocator for the memory
allocation. Up to six chunk sizes (a power of 2 from 64B) are supported by configuring the Slab
Allocator. Table 3.6 shows various slab configurations used in this experiment. Each configuration
type has a unique characteristic (e.g., uniform distribution, more small-sized slabs).
Figure 3.13 shows simulation results of these slab configurations. In USR, more than 90% of
queries access small-sized values (e.g., 2B), so the slab configuration that has more small-sized
chunks can reduce the cache miss ratio. In APP, the average value size is about 270B. When Type
C configuration that does not have large-sized chunks is applied to APP, the cache miss ratio is
more than 70% since most requested values cannot be cached in L1 key-value cache. In APP, we
need 512B chunks to store most requested values; thus Type E that has many large-sized chunks can
reduce the cache miss ratio to 40%.
The cache miss ratio can be improved by configuring the chunk sizes and their numbers in L1
key-value cache in response to value sizes in an expected workload. In the proposed design, soft-
processor in L1 key-value cache can configure the chunk sizes and their numbers at a boot time.
Table 3.6: Chunk size configurations (In Type A, the number of 64B chunks is 70k).
Type 64B 128B 256B 512B 1024B 2048B Note
A 70k 70k 70k 70k 70k 70k Uniform
B 120k 100k 80k 60k 40k 20k More small sizes
C 160k 140k 120k 0 0 0 No large sizes
D 140k 120k 100k 30k 20k 10k More small sizes
E 20k 40k 60k 80k 100k 120k More large sizes
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Figure 3.12: Eviction policies on set-associative L1 key-value cache.
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Figure 3.13: Five slab configurations on L1 key-value cache.
3.6.7 Cache Miss Ratio vs. Throughput
Finally, Figure 3.14 compares the proposed multi-layer key-value cache and L1 key-value only de-
signs in terms of the total throughput when the L1 key-value cache miss ratio is varied from 10% to
90%. GET queries are injected in a 10Gbps line rate (i.e., 9.32Mops). In the multi-layer key-value
cache case (Figure 3.14(a)), L2 key-value cache miss ratio is fixed at 15%, which is a conservative
assumption. As L1 key-value cache miss ratio increases, L2 key-value cache and memcached soft-
ware process more queries. Please note that the throughput decreases quite slowly in the multi-layer
key-value cache case when L1 key-value cache miss ratio is less than 40%, while the throughput
decreases linearly in the L1 key-value only case.
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Figure 3.14: Multi-layer key-value cache miss ratio vs. throughput.
3.7 Summary
This chapter introduced multi-layer key-value cache architecture combining in-NIC and in-kernel
caches. Each component: in-NIC key-value store acceleration and in-kernel key-value store acceler-
ation, has actively studied so far. But, each approach has disadvantages in terms of cache capacity
and power e ciency. To complement these drawbacks, multi-layer key-value cache architecture was
proposed to utilize them.
For the building block, there are a variety of design options to compose cache organization. Thus,
we explore them with a simulator using realistic workload. This chapter introduced preferred design
options, based on simulation results.
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Chapter 4
Hierarchical In-NIC Key-value Cache Design
The previous chapter introduced concept based on simulation and basic proof of concept using a
simple prototype. This chapter describes the practical implementation of in-NIC key-value cache
design. This chapter focuses on inside in-NIC design and shows hierarchical in-NIC cache design
combining on-chip RAM and on-board DRAM. As shown in Figure 4.1, this chapter introduces
level 0 (L0) key-value cache, based on on-chip RAM to in-NIC cache of multi-layer key-value cache
architecture, proposed in the previous chapter. Furthur, power e cient schemes are also introduced
for scheduling software and hardware switching. Section 4.1 introduces the background behind
this architecture. Section 4.2 provides a concrete architecture design of key-value cache integrated to
NIC. Section 4.3 evaluates di↵frent design aspects. Section 4.4 provides design trade-o↵. Section 4.5
describes an on-demand controller. Lastly, Section 4.6 summarizes this chapter.
4.1 Background
The previous chapter introduced multi-layer key-value cache architecture. This chapter focuses on
micro-level in-NIC design and introduces hierarchical in-NIC cache design for higher performance
and an acceleration hardware as in-network computing.
In-network computing is an emerging area in computing, where applications natively running on
the host are accelerated by running them on network devices. While hardware acceleration is typi-
cally done on stand-alone programmable platforms [10], in-network computing executes the applica-
tions on programmable network devices, such as network interface cards (NICs) or switches [43,44].
These network devices provide both the networking functionality and the execution of an application
at the same time [45].
In-network computing has been shown to provide throughput and latency improvement of orders
of magnitude [43,45]. Furthermore, the use cases are far from being limited to networking functions;
examples include consensus [46], data processing [47], machine learning [48] and more. The most
popular use case of in-network computing is for cache-based applications (e.g., [43]). The placement
of the in-network computing device within the network saves traversals of the network by-design
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Figure 4.1: Chapter 4 introduces L0 key-value cache, based on on-chip RAM.
[45], and is ideal for handling frequently repeated requests for information. This work focuses on
one class of caching applications, the caching of key-value store, to study design trade-o↵s in in-
network computing.
Online services such as e-commerce and social networks, mostly running in the cloud [5], are
commonly using key-value store. Key-value store deployments in datacenters are often scaled-out in
order to increase performance [6], which leads in turn to increased power consumption. One of the
limitations of key-value store is that it is very sensitive to latency, in the order of tens of microsec-
onds, end-to-end [49]. Using in-network computing has the potential to significantly improve the
performance of key-value store based applications.
While in-network computing has attracted a lot of attention over the last few years, most of the
work has focused on ASIC-driven implementations [43–45, 47]. The design trade-o↵s in building
in-network computing platforms, and in particular those implemented using FPGAs, have to the best
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of our knowledge, not been explored.
4.2 Architecture
Single-node memcached servers have been shown in the past to process queries at around 370kqps
(query per second) on an Intel Xeon machine [19], with more modern servers achieving close to a
million queries per second. Using consistent hashing algorithms has been shown to improve this
throughput by an order of magnitude [50]. Large services, such as e-commerce or social networking
services, therefore use tens to thousands of data center servers to sustain the query rate they require.
LaKe is an in-network computing LayeredKey-value store architecture, focused on memcached
with two layers: on-chip RAM and on-board DRAM. LaKe is FPGA-based and provides both
network-switching functionality and key-value store acceleration. It achieves significant performance
improvement by using multiple layers of cache. Each cache layer provides a trade-o↵ between per-
formance (latency, throughput) and memory size. LaKe runs on a platform that also acts, at the same
time, as a NIC or a switch, therefore eliminating the need the cost of adding additional hardware.
The performance achieved by LaKe reduces by an order of magnitude the number of servers required
in the data center. This section explores its architecture, as shown in Figure 4.2.
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L1 key-value cache architecture was shown in Section 3.3. In this chapter, to provide higher
e ciency, hierarchy design with micro-level in-NIC cache is built: on-chip RAM and on-board o↵-
chip DRAM as shown in Figure 4.1. Further, to optimize proof of concept, some parts of the design
were upgraded, compared with the previous design in Section 3.3.
4.2.1 High Level Architecture
The LaKe architecture, a hardware component utilized with software components. It assumes that the
software components are L2 key-value cache introduced in the previous section and the memcached
host software, modified to support UDP binary protocol. Please note that we use only memcached
host application as a software component in this section. The hardware component, which is the
focus of this section, is a combined design of a networking device and a memcached accelerator
running on a single platform.
The architecture of LaKe is shown in Figure 4.2. While LaKe can operate either as a switch or a
network interface card (NIC), let us assume for clarity that it is used as a NIC. Tra c arrives to LaKe
from multiple sources. A packet classifier is used to distinguish between memcached queries and any
other type of tra c; general tra c will be sent to the host, as in a standard NIC, while memcached
queries will be sent to the LaKe module. Queries that are a miss in LaKe’s cache and memory, are
sent to the host.
LaKe is implemented on the NetFPGA-SUME platform [27]. The network data plane is based on
the NetFPGA Reference Switch project, which can also operate as a NIC, and we amend it with logic
enabling memcached operation, as shown in Figure 4.3. Modules unique to LaKe are marked in dark
gray. Incoming tra c frommultiple ports is fed into the data plane using an arbitration module (Input
Arbiter). A packet classifier, unique to the proposed design, identifies the type of the packet and sends
memcached packets to the LaKe module, described later in this section. Non-memcached tra c
continues in the pipeline, where it is merged (using a second arbiter) with packets returning from the
memcached module: both reply packets, going back to clients, and missed queries, forwarded to the
host. The destination of the packet is set in an output port lookup module, and packets wait in an
Output Queues module to their turn to be transmitted.
4.2.2 LaKe Module
To improve performance bottlenecks and enable scalability across di↵erent platforms, LaKe adopts
a multi-core processor approach for query processing, similar to the design described in the previous
chapter. The architecture of the LaKe module is shown in Figure 4.4.
Incoming queries are evenly spread between a set of processing elements (PEs), using a multi-
plexing and demultiplexing PE-network. Each PE receives and processes queries. Once a query is
processed, the PE accesses a shared memory network. Three types of memories are connected to
the memory network: DRAM, containing the hash table bucket and data store chunks (Section 4.2.3,
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Section 4.2.4), SRAM, containing chunk information (Section 4.2.4), and CAM, serving as a look
up table (LUT) for retrieving key-value pairs (Section 4.2.5).
Figure 4.5 illustrates the request-response process of a query in LaKe. As a new query arrives, the
PE parses the packet and extracts the command, key and value. Next, the hash of the extracted key
is calculated. In the proposed implementation, CRC32 is used as the hash function. The hash value
serves as a pointer to an address in the DRAM, holding a descriptor (hash table bucket) pointing to
the key-value pair in the memory. If a key exists in LaKe’s memory, it is considered a hit, otherwise
it is a miss. Upon a SET command that is a hit (Figure 4.5(a)), both the hash table and the key-value
pair data are updated in the DRAM. If a SET command arrives with a new key (miss, Figure 4.5(b)),
the PE assigns it to a chunk using a list of free descriptors stored in the SRAM and pointing to empty
chunks. As a write-through policy is used, any SET query is also sent to the host’s memcached
server.
For a GET query that is a hit, a reply is prepared in the Packet Deparser and returned to the
client. Otherwise, the request is forwarded to the host memcached server through the switch datapath
(Figure 4.5(c)) and using a DMA engine [27]. The host then sends a reply to LaKe (Figure 4.5(d)),
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which updates the key and value in the cache and DRAM before sending the reply to the user.
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4.2.3 Hash Table
The hash table is used to store descriptors pointing from a hashed key to the address in memory
of the actual key-value pair. As such, it is a critical component in the design. The data structure
of the descriptors in the hash table is shown in Figure 4.6. The descriptor size is 64bit, which is
performance optimized: the DDR3 uses a burst size of 8 and data bus width of 64bit, which leads in
turn to a bus width from the DDR3 controller of 512bit. This allows in a single access to read eight
descriptor entries, enabling 8-associativity. To reduce the number of accesses to the DRAM, a key’s
length is compared to the key’s length in the descriptor, and only if they match the PE attempts to
access the DRAM and read the key-value chunk.
In the design previously described in Section 3.3, a hash table entry includes a maximum 64
bytes key. When we use more than 64 bytes key, multiple entries are assumed to be used. However,
this is complicated logic and leads to in-e ciency in hash table, since duplicated addresses in hash
table become invalid. Thus, a new hash table entry does not include a key, moving a key to data store
managed by slab allocator. As a result, in order to retrieve a key, we need two memory access: hash
table, and data store.
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4.2.4 Memory Management
Memcached builds upon a slab allocator to e ciently use the memory [6, 30]. This approach is also
taken in hardware-based designs, as well as in LaKe, enabling to handle variable key- and value-
length.
Similar to the design previously described in Section 3.3, a slab allocator is implemented using
an SRAM-based memory, storing addresses of unused chunks. However, in this version. we do not
use soft CPU for the processing slab allocation. To reduce access time to the SRAM, LaKe uses a
small cache (implemented as a FIFO), which pre-loads the next available addresses from memory.
The number of entries in the SRAM can be calculated using the following formula:
Pn
k=i S kNk 
Cmem, where S k, Nk and Cmem denotes the size of chunk, the number of chunks and SRAM capacity,
respectively. We use multiplications of 64B as slab size, and support 64B, 128B, 256B and 512B
chunk sizes in our prototype. The minimum size slab is determined by the width of the memory
network datapath: 512bit.
Shared cache To conceal DRAM access latency, LaKe uses a shared cache for each data context:
hash table and data store. These caches are located in front of the DRAM controller, rather than inside
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a PE, in order to enable PE scalability and avoid holding data context (such as CPU process) inside a
PE. In this manner, frequent keys and values are referred from caches, immediately. Each cache has
in our prototype 1024 entries, implemented using a BRAM. We employ write through as the update
policy, thus cache coherency is maintained for both cache and DRAM.
DRAM access: Random access to the DRAM has a non-negligible and variable latency, which
can stall PEs. To attend to this latency we integrate a small cache (e.g., 64B cache line, write through,
direct-map, total capacity 64kB). Without the cache, we measure the DRAM controller’s access
latency (using Xilinx MIG, running at 933.33MHz) to be around 115ns in a zero load test, and to be
up to 650ns under high load.
PE scalability: LaKe applies a modular, scalable approach to key-value store acceleration. The
number of PEs supported by the design starts at one and scales up, with five PEs su cient to support
per-port full line rate. Beyond physically implementing a variable number of PEs, LaKe also allows
to controlling on-the-fly the number of PEs used, balancing workload and power e ciency.
4.2.5 Memcache Protocol
Memcached systems [6] generally use the memcache protocol. There are two memcache protocol
variants: ASCII based and binary based. Binary protocol over UDP/IP is used in the proposed cache
system. The challenge using the memcache protocol is that key-value pairs cannot be identified in
responses from the host. For example, a GET request missed in the hardware and sent to the host
will have a query response returning with the value but without the key. Thus, cache systems cannot
handle only response packets; it is required to learn and save request query’s information.
To associate a key with a returning value, memcache protocol’s opaque field and source UDP
port number are used. Memcache protocol uses a 32-bit opaque field, and memcached systems use
the same opaque value in both request and reply. A lookup module is used to match returned values
from a host with their paired keys. The LUT is implemented using a CAM, where we query using
the opaque value and the source UDP port, and the reply is the original query’s key. The keys are
updated every time a GET query is a miss in the hardware and forwarded to the host.
4.3 Evaluations
The evaluation of LaKe covers two aspects: absolute performance, and the exploration of design
trade-o↵s. The evaluation results are summarized in Table 4.1.
4.3.1 Absolute Performance
The absolute performance of LaKe is evaluated, based on several performance metrics: throughput,
latency and power e ciency. The performance is compared with memcached (v1.5.1), a software im-
plementation, and Emu’s memcached implementation [51], a hardware-acceleration of memcached
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using the binary protocol. Emu is selected as it is comparable, being available as open-source on
NetFPGA-SUME, yet it does not support networking functionality, only memcached-acceleration.
Emu also supports only the on-chip cache, and cannot forward a missed query to a server.
4.3.1.1 Test Setup
The server uses Intel Core i7-4770 CPU, 64GB RAM, running Ubuntu 14.04 LTS (Linux kernel
3.19.0) and NetFPGA-SUME card. OSNT [52] is used for tra c injection. A 10GbE port is con-
nected to LaKe-side card. GET requests including 4B key and 8B value are injected at 10Gbps.
Throughput is measured on a second granularity. For comparison with software-based memcached,
the memcached software was amended to support binary protocol over UDP.
4.3.1.2 Maximum Throughput
For maximum throughput, all three designs are compared using a warmed cache. LaKe achieves
a throughput of 13.1Mqps (query per second) when all the queries are hit in the shared-cache, as
shown in Table 4.1. This is ⇥6.7 improvement compared with Emu [51], and ⇥13.6 improvement
compared with memcached running on the host. The throughput achieved is equivalent to 10GbE
line rate, using the given query size, and requires only 5 PEs.
4.3.1.3 Latency
An Endace DAG card 10X2-S (4ns resolution) is used to measure queries’ latency. A software-
based client is used to generate queries, and the DAG measures the isolated latency of LaKe, client
excluded. Despite supporting both memcached and networking functionality, as well as using the
DRAM, LaKe’s latency on a hit (1.16µs) is better than Emu (1.21µs), thanks to the small shared-
cache (64kB) in front of the DRAM. When queries are miss in the shared-cache, and hit in the
DRAM, the latency is 5.6µs. Emu does not support cache misses. LaKe’s latency is ⇥205 better than
a host-based memcached on a hit, and ⇥42 better on a miss in the cache and a hit in the DRAM. A
miss in both cache and DRAM means LaKe and a host-based memcached will have about the same
latency, as LaKe will forward the query to the host. The only penalty is the first lookup in the DRAM
of the key.
4.3.2 Scalability
LaKe scales up both in throughput and resources.
Area and Resources: Up to six PEs were implemented while maintaining 200MHz core fre-
quency. Each PE utilizes around 3% of chip slices and 2% BRAMs, as shown in Figure 4.7. These
values include also the interconnection networks, as each PE is connected with both PE-network and
memory switch. The small overhead in resources taken by each PE enables scaling the number of
PEs used by LaKe with little e↵ect on resource consumption.
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Figure 4.7: The area utilization of LaKe implemented on NetFPGA SUME.
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Figure 4.8: Throughput and latency as a function of number of PEs.
Throughput: The throughput scalability of LaKe is evaluated using OSNT [52]. First, the cache
is warmed using a SET request. Next, OSNT generates GET requests, matching the warmed cache,
using a 4B key, and returning an 8B value. The throughput scalability as a function of the number of
PEs is shown in Figure 4.8. As the figure shows, LaKe can handle up to 13.1Mqps using five PEs,
when the queries are hit in the shared-cache in front of the DRAM. Each PE processes up to 3.3Mqps.
The bottleneck on throughput growth is the memory interconnect core and memory bandwidth. The
throughput grows linearly with the number of PEs until reaching these bottlenecks. On a platform
with more memory interfaces, or with a higher speed memory, a higher throughput can be achieved.
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Figure 4.10: The throughput and latency of LaKe
as a function of core frequency.
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Figure 4.11: LaKe’s throughput and latency un-
der varying hit ratio in the on-chip cache. Queries
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Core frequency: LaKe is a pipelined design. As such, its throughput depends on its packet
processing rate. This packet processing rate, which is shared for the networking data plane and the
LaKe memcached module, is fully achieved at a core frequency of 160MHz, as shown in Figure 4.10.
Below this frequency, the NetFPGA platform has a performance limitation in its 10GbE ports 1.
Mean latency drops with core frequency increase: this is as the number of stages in the pipeline is
maintained, but the duration of each clock cycle is reduced.
Hit ratio: The hit ratio in the cache plays a critical role in the performance on an in-network
computing design. Figure 4.11 demonstrates the e↵ect of the hit ratio on the performance of LaKe.
The x-axis indicates the hit ratio of the keys in the on-chip cache. The y-axis indicates the maximum
throughput (left) and mean latency (right). Mean latency is measured at a constant query rate of
10Kpps, for all hit ratios, since as shown in Section 4.4, the latency is subject to change under
di↵erent query rates. The maximum latency, measured across all hit-ratios, is only 1.9µs. The e↵ect
of the hit ratio is mandatory to in-network computing solutions, as the size on the on-chip cache
1https://github.com/NetFPGA/NetFPGA-SUME-live/issues/36
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Table 4.1: Performance comparison.
System Average latency [µs] Throughput [kqps] Power e ciency [kqps/Watt.]
memcached(software) 238.84 962 9.938
Emu (hardware) [51] 1.21 1932 47.121
LaKe (shared-cache) 1.16 13120 242.962
directly a↵ects the performance of the device. In devices where the memory capacity is in the order
of megabytes to tens of megabytes [53], this becomes a crucial element.
Figure 4.12 continues the exploration of hit-ratio e↵ect, by exploring the e↵ect of hit ratio in the
DRAM, and LaKe as a whole. The x-axis in Figure 4.12 indicates the overall hit ratio in both on-chip
cache and DRAM. The hit ratio in the on-chip cache is fixed to 10%, and vary the hit ratio in the
DRAM, with all queries missed in the DRAM being sent to the host. As the results show, throughput
linearly increases with the hit ratio in the DRAM.
4.3.3 Power E ciency
Next, we evaluate the power e ciency of LaKe. A wall power meter is used to measure power
consumption. power e ciency is calculated as E = T/W, where E, T andW denote power e ciency,
throughput, and power consumption, respectively. LaKe achieves 242.962 kqps/Watt using five PEs
at full line rate. This is ⇥5.1 improvement compared with Emu.
Dynamic power consumption is investigated by measuring how power consumption varies as a
function of throughput. Power consumption is normalized to 0W under zero load, i.e. the static power
consumption. The dynamic power consumption takes up to 3.4W on LaKe modules, while software-
based memcached consumes a maximum of 58.2W dynamically. Thus, LaKe reduces dynamic power
consumption by more than an order of magnitude. Moreover, the power e ciency of LaKe scales
linearly with throughput (as shown in Figure 4.9), much better than a host’s power e ciency does.
To put it in order words, LaKe’s power consumption changes very little under load, which means
that it is most e cient when the query rate is maximal. Even under low query rate, LaKe’s power
e ciency is better than running on a host.
4.4 Design Trade-O↵s
The previous section has introduced the absolute performance of LaKe. This section focuses on
trade-o↵s in the design of LaKe, and extrapolates from them to in-network computing designs at
large.
In-network computing applications tend to implement cache using only on-chip memory [43,
45, 54]. For key-value store applications, this leads to a very small percentage of keys that can be
cached: in the orders of thousands to tens of thousands on an FPGA, and in the order of hundreds
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of thousands to a million on an ASIC. For example, NetChain [44] suggests that up to 10MB on a
Tofino switch can be used as a cache. This number of cache entries is insu cient for large key-value
store systems: in Facebook, between a billion and hundred billion unique keys are accessed every
hour [40], with 18.4% to 74.7% of these keys accessed within 5 minutes (For Facebook’s di↵erent
workloads [40]). It is therefore important to understand the e↵ect of using external memories on
in-network computing performance.
So far the evaluation used a fully-featured LaKe: using BRAM, SRAM and DRAM. Next, we
check the e↵ect of each on the performance. Note that for this discussion the design employs a single
DRAM module (4GB) which utilizes both hash table region (2GB: 268M entries) and a data store
region (2GB: 33M entries as 64B chunk), and consumes 4W.When BRAM is used instead of DRAM,
the number of hash table entries and data store entries are 4096 entries and 512 entries, respectively.
Two SRAM modules (total 18MB) are also employed to manage free-list on slab allocation. When
BRAM is used instead of SRAM, the number of free-list addresses stored is 144 entries.
When only the BRAM is used, and the SRAM and DRAMmemory controllers are taken out, the
maximum power consumption of LaKe is 16W including NetFPGA-SUME card — almost identical
to a standalone switch, and the maximum throughput is 13.1Mqps. Under these circumstances we
use a BRAM-based 1k entry cache as hash table and data store instead of a DRAM, and use BRAM-
based FIFO as slab allocator instead of an SRAM.
Adding the SRAM adds 6W and holds 4.7M chunk addresses, which are updated when a DELETE
operation moves a specific chunk to the free list. A BRAM-based FIFO placed in front of the SRAM
is used to hide SRAM access latency, but is shallow in comparison with the SRAM. One can there-
fore trade the 6W SRAM power consumption with the number of available chunks on LaKe. Al-
ternatively, one can use a DRAM to store chunk address: this solution is cheaper and more power
e cient than using SRAM, but results in an increased latency and considerably lower throughput.
The use of DRAM as a first level cache increases the number of keys hit in LaKe. However, as
can be expected, DRAM access does not provide the same performance as on-chip cache access. As
shown in Figure 4.8, the maximum throughput using DRAM only is 6.3Mqps (using five PEs ), lower
than using the shared-cache. To understand the throughput of the DRAM, we isolate the DRAM from
the LaKe module, and consider its latency under low and high utilization. As Figure 4.13 shows,
while the latency is almost constant without a load, under high utilization the latency almost doubles.
Memcached accesses to the memory are random and not sequential, as keys are not requested in a
sorted order, this double-latency explains the 6.3Mqps throughput achieved using the DRAM.
While using the DRAM may seem as a disadvantage, it is in fact an advantage: access to the
DRAM is only upon a miss in the cache, and replaces an access to the host memory (as in a device
without a DRAM). In this manner, significant time (⇥42) and dynamic power (⇥17) are saved.
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Figure 4.13: The cumulative distribution function of READ latency from the DRAM, for a Random
access, under zero and high load. Strict, Normal and Relax are the three memory controller access
modes [1].
4.5 On-demand Controller
This section discusses our LaKe, in-network computing device should be treated as one would treat
other scheduled computing resources. Workloads can be assigned to network devices, and one should
be able to reallocate the workloads to other computing resources. Section 4.5.1 provides an analy-
sis describing when in-network computing can be optimally used, and next the how is discussed..
Section 4.5.2 proposes the on-demand scheme in terms of power consumption, CPU usage and traf-
fic rate. Section 4.5.3 provides the details of host-controlled on-demand and network-controlled
on-demand. Section 4.5.4 discusses the controllers.
4.5.1 Power and Performance Measurement
Here, we examine that in-NIC cache can be power hungry [55], by evaluating the power consump-
tion of in-NIC cache and memcached. The power consumption is evaluated for both software- and
hardware-based implementations, including overheads, e.g., power supply unit.
Experiment Setup In this experiment, an Intel Core i7-6770 4-cores server, running at 4GHz,
equipped with 64GBRAM, 10GEMellanox NIC (MCX311A-XCCT), and Ubuntu 14.04 LTS (Linux
kernel 3.19.0) was used for software-based evaluation. For hardware-based evaluation, the NIC was
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replaced by NetFPGA-SUME [27] card.
OSNT [52] was used to send tra c, in which the rates can be controlled at fine granularities and
reproduce results. Average throughput was measured with a second granularity. An Endace DAG
card 10X2-S was used to measure latency, measuring the isolated latency of the application under
test, tra c source excluded. Power measurements were performed using SHW 3A power meter [56],
connected to the device under test’s power supply.
Results With LaKe, the role of the server software is not eliminated by shifting functionality to
hardware. LaKe serves as a first and second level cache. In the event of cache misses at both levels,
the software services the request. Memcached (v1.5.1) was used as both the host-side software reply-
ing to queries missed in LaKe’s cache, and as the software implementation we benchmark against.
The power consumption evaluation of LaKe, therefore, includes the combined power consumption of
the NetFPGA board and the server. Note that the NIC is taken out of the server for LaKe’s evaluation,
as LaKe replaces it.
To measure the power consumption of LaKe and memcached, we start with the power consump-
tion of an idle system, and then gradually increase the query rate until reaching peak performance.
Peak performance is full line rate for LaKe and approximately 1Mpps for memcached. It is verified
that the CPU reaches full utilization using all 4-cores.
Figure 4.14 shows the power to throughput trade-o↵ for the key-value store. The x-axis indicates
the number of queries sent to the server every second, while the y-axis indicates the power con-
sumption of the server under such load. It shows the power consumption for memcached (software
only), LaKe within a server, and LaKe as a standalone platform, i.e., working outside a server and
without the power consumption contributed by the hosting server. As the figure shows, the power
consumption of the server while idle or under low utilization is just 39W, while LaKe draws 59W
even when idle. However, the picture changes quickly as query rate increases. At less than 100Kpps,
LaKe is already more power e cient than the software-based key-value store, with the crossing point
occurring around 80Kpps.
LaKe has a high base power consumption, but the consumption does not increase significantly
under load. Figure 4.14 shows the throughput up to 2Mpps. But, please note that LaKe reached full
line rate performance, supporting over 13Mpps for the same power consumption.
4.5.2 Scheduling Scheme
The experiments have shown that there is no silver bullet for using in-network computing while
maintaining power e ciency at all times. Not only do in-network computing designs vary so much
between platforms, but also on the same platform there are many components that can a↵ect power
e ciency, as shown by the example of libpaxos and DPDK. This is, however, not unlike standard net-
work switching where seemingly “similar” switches from di↵erent vendors have up to ⇥2 di↵erence
in power consumption [57].
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Figure 4.14: Power vs throughput comparison of key-value store.
As there is no doubt that in-network computing o↵ers significant performance benefits (Sec-
tion 4.5.1), it is essential to get the performance benefit of in-network computing, without losing
power e ciency.
Thus, this section proposes in-network computing on demand, a scheme to dynamically shift
computing between servers and the network, according to load and power consumption. This scheme
is useful where identical applications run on the server and in the network, as in our examples. It can
be applied to a wide range of applications, though possibly not all (as discussed later). It is also not
applicable to bespoke in-network computing applications, which have no server-side equivalent.
The power consumption using in-network computing on demand is illustrated in Figure 4.15.
As the figure shows, at low utilization power consumption is derived from the properties of the
software-based system. As utilization increases, processing is shifted to the network, and the power
consumption changes little with utilization.
Here, the communication cost associated with in-network computing on demand is considered.
Stateless applications will require no additional communication cost to run, whereas stateful appli-
cation will have a communication cost that is bounded by the communication cost of shifting the
application from one server to another. The networking device providing in-network computing ser-
vices is expected to be en-route to a server running the application (otherwise it is not in-network
computing, but standard o✏oading), meaning that no additional latency is introduced.
Two components are required to support in-network computing on demand. The first is a con-
troller, deciding where the processing should be done and when the processing should be shifted
between a server and the network. The second is an application-specific task, which may be null, in
charge of the actual transition of an application.
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Figure 4.15: Power consumption of key-value store using in-network computing on demand. Solid
lines indicate in-network computing on demand, and dashed lines indicate software-based solutions.
4.5.3 In-network Computing On Demand Controller
Two types of in-network computing on demand controllers are considered: host-controlled and
network-controlled. This section shows proofs-of-concept for both approaches and evaluates them.
There are trade-o↵s between the two approaches. The network-controlled approach typically reacts
faster, but must make its choices based on fewer parameters. On the other hand, host-controlled takes
time due to measure power consumption and CPU usage.
Network-controlled in-network computing. The first controller design makes o✏oading de-
cisions in the network hardware, based on the tra c load. The goal is to reduce load on the host
as early as possible, to take out bottlenecks, and provide another layer of o✏oading (rather than en-
cumbering the host with an additional controller). The control is not entirely automatic: all of its
parameters are configurable.
Figure 4.16 shows network-controlled in-network computing scheme. The controller utilizes a
pair of parameters to shift a workload from the host to the network. The first parameter is the average
packet rate that would trigger the transition, and the second is the averaging period (implemented as
a sliding window). If the average packet rate of the accelerated application exceeds the packet rate
threshold over the averaging period, the device transitions the workload to the network. A mirror
pair of parameters is used to shift workloads from the network back to the host. Using two sets of
parameters provides hysteresis, and attends to concerns of rapidly shifting workloads back-and-forth
between the host and the network.
The values used to configure the controller are taken from the evaluation of the target application,
such as introduced in Section 4.5.1. This is, however, a downside of this approach, as it requires some
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Figure 4.16: Network side in-network computing controller
knowledge of the observed application. A second drawback is that this approach does not take into
account the actual power consumption of the host. A drawback of this approach is that it does not
take into account the actual power consumption of the host. It only has access to the packet rate.
Di↵erent applications have very di↵erent power profiles [58], and there is no suitable heuristic that
can be applied to the shifting thresholds. The proposed controller is implemented in 40 lines of code
within the FPGA’s classifier module, and consumes negligible resources (order of 0.1%).
Host-controlled In-network Computing. The second controller design makes o✏oading deci-
sions at the host, using information such as the CPU usage and power consumption. A shift occurs
when there is a clear power consumption benefit, and the o✏oading leading leads to a performance
gain. A shift may also happen when computing demands exceed available resources, and the network
provides extra computing capacity.
Similar to the network-based controller, the host-based controller maintains two sets of parame-
ters: one for shifting the workload to the network, and one for shifting the workload back. As long
as the application is running, the controller monitors its CPU usage. The end-host’s power consump-
tion is also monitored using running average power limit (RAPL). If the application exceeds a given
power threshold set for o✏oading, and CPU usage is high, the controller shifts the workload to the
network. Monitoring the power consumption alone is not su cient, as high power consumption can
be triggered by multiple applications running on the same host. As before, the information is in-
spected over time, avoiding harsh decisions based on spikes and outliers. In order to shift back to the
host from the network, the controller needs information from the network (e.g., packet rate processed
using in-network computing). Otherwise, the shift may be ine cient, or cause a workload to bounce
back and forth. The proposed controller is implemented in 204 lines of code, and consumes only
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Figure 4.17: Host side in-network computing controller
0.3% CPU usage, mainly for performing RAPL reads.
The host-controlled approach provides better control and flexibility to the user. Yet, care needs
to be taken when benchmarking a workload [59]. An advantage of the host-controlled approach
is that we do not need application knowledge. Unlike the network-driven approach, one needs to
know only CPU usage and target power consumption. This does not mean that any application
can be o✏oaded: the network device must support the application. However, there is no need for
a full power/performance characterization. The host-based controller is not perfect: it does incur
a (small) processing overhead and it does require longer reaction cycles than a network-hardware
controller. The algorithms used are naive, providing a proof of concept. They can be enhanced by
more sophisticated algorithms. In energy proportional servers, energy e ciency is not linear, though
power consumption still grows linearly with utilization [60], and algorithms such as those based on
PEAS [61] may improve energy consumption. These algorithms are beyond the scope of this section
and remain part of future work.
4.5.4 Discussion
4.5.4.1 Managing in-network computing on demand.
Power consumption di↵ers between use-cases, and each application has a di↵erent optimal thresh-
old for switching between software and hardware. While we demonstrated a transition based on
throughput, a di↵erent approach would be to monitor the utilization of CPUs or VMs. While mon-
itoring power consumption sounds like a palatable idea, it would be hard to apply it in a machine
serving multiple users and running multiple services. While there is a value in characterizing the
power consumption-to-throughput of each application, a more practical approach would be to apply
a rule of thumb to migration, based on throughput or CPU utilization. Such a value would need to
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apply for hysteresis and ignore short bursts of activity.
Generality of in-network computing on demand. in-network computing is not the magic cure-
all for data center’s problems. Not all applications are suitable to be shifted to the network, and
the gain will not be the same for all. In-network computing is best suited for applications that are
network-intensive, i.e., where the communication between hosts has a high toll on the CPU. Latency
sensitive applications are also well suited for in-network computing. It is no coincidence that the
most popular in-network computing applications to date are caching related [29, 43, 44]. Caching
provides a large benefit in the common case, and a way to handle tail events. Other applications may
find in-network computing on demand to be hard. For example, using Paxos in the network is hard,
and doing it on demand is even harder. The e↵ort of implementing an in-network computing solution
may just be too high for some applications. Furthermore, each application may have a di↵erent
power consumption gain, as shown in Figure 4.15.
In-network computing alternatives. Readers may wonder if there are no simpler solutions to
increase application performance, rather than in-network computing. One solution, for example,
is using multiple standard NICs in a server to achieve higher bandwidth [62, 63]. However, this
approach comes at the cost of more NICs, increasing power and price. Alternatively, one may use
multiple servers, or opt for a multi-socket or multi-node architecture [64]. These may be cost and
power equivalent to an FPGA, a smartNIC, or an ASIC based design. But, their performance per
watt is unlikely to match the ASIC-based solution. GPUs are e cient for o✏oading computation-
heavy applications, but as they are not directly connected to the network, they are less suitable for
network-intensive applications.
FPGA, SmartNIC or Switch? “Where should I place my in-network computing application?”
one may wonder. The answer is not conclusive. Today, a switch ASIC can provide both the highest
performance and the highest performance per Watt. It may not be, however, the cheapest solution,
with a price tag of ⇥10 or more compared to other solutions2. Use a switch as the place to implement
in-network computing leads to other questions. What is the topology of the network? Can and will
all messages travel through a specific (non addressed) switch? What are the implications of a switch
failure (as opposed to a smartNIC/FPGA next to the end-host)? The answers are all application and
data center dependent.
SmartNICs maintain the same power consumption as NICs, typically limiting their power con-
sumption to 25W supplied through the PCI express slot, while achieving millions of operations per
Watt, including external memories access [65, 66]. Many smartNICs are, in-fact, FPGA based [67–
69].
Of the three, FPGA (and FPGA-based smartNICs) is likely to provide the poorest performance
and performance per Watt, due to its general purpose nature. Yet, FPGA performance per Watt in
real data centers is not significantly below ASIC. Azure’s FPGA-based AccelNet SmartNIC [67] con-
sumes 17W-19W (standalone) on a board supporting 40GE, providing close to 4Mpps/W for some
2List prices, obtained from https://colfaxdirect.com
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use cases. This is slightly better, but on a par with, the FPGA-based power consumption reported in
this work. The big advantage of FPGA, and FPGA-based platforms, is their flexibility—the ability
to implement almost every application and to use (on a bespoke board) any interface, memory or
storage device. ASIC-based smartNICs may not be suitable for every in-network function, but for
many applications, they will provide a good trade-o↵ of programmability, cost, maturity and power
consumption.
4.6 Summary
This chapter introduced in-NIC key-value cache design for a practical case. While L1 key-value
cache consists of only on-board DRAM in the previous chapter, this chapter introduced L1 key-value
cache composed of on-chip RAM and on-board DRAM to hide latency and to improve performance.
LaKe was introduced as a new architecture for energy e cient in-NIC key-value cache. LaKe can
serve as a switch or a NIC, while presenting a multi-core, multi-level cache architecture, that balances
throughput, latency and power e ciency. LaKe achieves ⇥17 better energy e ciency than running
on a host, with ⇥6.7 to ⇥13.6 higher throughput, maintaining two orders of magnitude better latency.
LaKe does all that without giving up memcached functionality and while supporting a large and
scalable number of keys. Further, this chapter introduced optimized scheduling schemes for power
e ciency.
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Chapter 5
The Case for DDoS Amplification Attack
This chapter introduces the applied case to DDoS mitigation, the important Internet security issue.
Section 5.1 introduces background of DDoS amplificaiton attack. Section 5.2 introduces related
work regarding DDoS detection and prevention. Section 5.3 then proposes architecture and detec-
tion scheme. Section 5.4 shows evaluations for absolute performance and capability of our system.
Section 5.5 discusses further research and then Section 5.6 remarks summary.
5.1 Introduction
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack is a significant problem of the Internet. Major DDoS
attacks exhaust network or server resources of victims. Amplification attacks using UDP-based
protocols such as DNS and NTP try to exhaust link capacity on victim networks. TCP SYN flooding
attacks lead to victim servers consuming CPU resources. With the growth of importance of services
on the Internet, DDoS attacks are not negligible from the viewpoint of service availability. Hence,
mitigating DDoS attack has become increasingly important.
The volume of DDoS attacks to exhaust network resources is increasing due to the growth of
link speed and server performance. Recently, the DDoS using Mirai botnet is reported that the most
massive tra c volume of DDoS attack becomes over 600Gbps with infected 600k devices [70]. In
addition, as of Feburary, 2018, memcached is also used as an amplifier and the attack becomes more
than 1.35TBps, targeted to Cloudflare and Github. Akamai reported that Github servers receieved
1.35TB tra c [71]. Also, 66% of DDoS attack’s targets are customers, such as end users, financial
and hosting services. The customer Autonomous Systems (AS) purchase transit connectivities that
are 10, 40 and up to 100Gbps links from transit network providers in general [72]. Therefore, today’s
DDoS attacks exhaust transit links e↵ortlessly; and thus DDoS attacks should be mitigated in transit
provider sides to protect customer networks.
On the other hand, a current dominant type of DDoS attack is DNS-based amplification attack.
The DNS protocol has a high tra c amplification rate, and there are over 12 millions of open recur-
sive resolvers around the world that can be used for amplification attack [73]. Furthermore, Arbor
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Networks reports that DNS occupies 85% of protocols used for amplification attacks [74]. Thus, if
DNS-based amplification attack is wholly prevented, most of DDoS attacks can be eliminated. It is a
critical issue to prevent DDoS tra c at a transit link since an Autonomous System needs to pay the
cost on communication fee with a transit AS depending on the volume of tra c.
This section focuses on the DDoS mitigation on a transit AS’s link. To address the increasing
volume of DDoS attack, detection, and prevention at the AS-level link bandwidth are required. In the
manner of software mitigation scheme, it is insu cient to forward the packets on data-plane to satisfy
over 10Gbps links. To build a middlebox for line rate mitigation, we need to choose a hardware-based
solution to achieve high forwarding throughput. This section proposes a novel hardware-based DDoS
mitigation system, called mitiKV, that focuses on DNS amplification attack. The mitiKV works as an
inline middlebox on a transit link between a transit provider and a customer network. mitiKV detects
and discards DDoS packets toward customer network without fail by using ICMP port unreachable
message. In addition, detecting and filtering the attacks are all processed in hardware-based key-
value store on Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA), so that mitiKV achieves high throughput
up to 100Gbps. A prototype system was developed on a NetFPGA-SUME board [27] and was
demonstrated to prevent DNS-based amplification attacks as a proof of concept.
The evaluation shows that mitiKV has a capability of mitigation in 10Gbps line rate. Besides,
it was tested with the Internet tra c combined with DDoS tra c. mitiKV can prevent only DDoS
tra c without a↵ecting the normal tra c of the Internet tra c. This methodology can apply to the
other types of UDP-based amplification attacks.
5.2 Related Work on DDoS Mitigation
This section will show related work in terms of detection methodology and storage design for de-
tected rules on DDoS mitigation.
5.2.1 Detection Methodology
DDoS detection mechanisms can be classified into two categories: anomaly detection and pattern
matching [75]. Anomaly detection based methods collect normal system or network behavior reg-
ularly and compare present state with the normal state to detect anomalies. PacketScore [76] based
on anomaly detection provides a score, called Conditional Legitimate Probability, that can be used
to decide a packet is malicious or not. An advantage of pattern matching over anomaly detection
is that it can detect several known attacks without fail. Snort [77], a popular open-source intrusion
detection system using pattern matching, has wide usage. The proposed detection method is also one
of pattern matching methods focusing on DNS-based amplification attack.
In addition to DDoS detection mechanisms, data-plane systems for packet forwarding and filter-
ing are also a fundamental part of DDoS mitigators. In such data-plane systems, high throughput is a
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technical issue to overcome the growth of attack tra c volume. CYSEP [78] is a hardware architec-
ture for firewall, encryption/decryption, message authentication, and DDoS mitigation. The DDoS
detection system of CYSEP is PacketScore [76], and it is designed to be implemented in ASIC. The
proposed mitiKV and CYSEP mitigation module prevent link congestion attacks from exhausting
on high-speed networks by hardware implementation. On the other hand, other hardware-based mit-
igation approaches, Sentinel [79] and SQL DDoS Mitigator [80], mitigate end host CPU resource
exhaustion attacks by generating and sending CAPTCHA [81]. While these hardware-based solu-
tions focus on conventional anomaly detection to accelerate statistical processing and prevention
system, this chapter proposes a novel detection scheme and optimal hardware-based key-value store
to hold the rules generated by this scheme. FPGA-based DDoS detection by using an e↵ective corre-
lation measuring is proposed in [82]. It needs 354ns to distinguish DDoS attacks. In this chapter, we
are assuming the case of the Internet backbone, and DDoS mitigation requires line rate processing on
the link. Although the sophisticated algorithm to detect anomalies takes a certain time, once rule is
added, simple pattern matching can detect DDoS without statistical processing, which is low latency.
As opposed to hardware-based technique, software-based packet inspection implementations
such as Snort [77] have plenty of flexibility to inspect and filter packets from the network. Although
software-based technique historically has performance drawbacks, many proposals were addressed
to alleviate the drawbacks to take both advantages of high-performance and flexible packet process-
ing simultaneously. Hardware-based approaches can achieve high throughput keeping low latency,
compared with software-based solutions. GASPP [83] is a network tra c processing framework
which integrates Graphic Processing Units (GPU) for their packet processing purposes. While tak-
ing advantage of flexible packet processing such as filtering with a regular expression specified by
users, it optimizes memory usage as well as packet scheduling for packet processing to speed up its
processing. It also integrates Snort to accelerate the performance to mitigate tra c from attacks. The
proposed method does not require such a flexible method for packet processing as it only needs to
look at a specific portion of a packet. This simplified detection with protocol behavior gives us an
opportunity to implement the mitigation middlebox as hardware.
5.2.2 Storage Design for Detected Rules
Hardware-based key-value store [10, 14, 84] has been studied last five years (e.g., FPGA and ASIC).
It is a suitable platform for networked systems such as DDoS filtering, since hardware-based solution
utilizes an external memory for large capacity to manage a key-value pair with low latency, compared
with software-based key-value stores.
Content addressable memory (CAM) is utilized on a commercial network switch and a router to
retrieve the destination of an incoming packet and to refer rules against a packet flow (e.g., ACL).
While ASIC-based CAM has a 40M-80M bits capacity [85], mitiKV prototype has 262k entries
(34M bits) on BRAM; it can be expanded with an external memory. For the defense of recent
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Figure 5.1: The overview of mitiKV installation on a provider network. mitiKV box is installed on
a provider side of a customer link and works as an inline middlebox.
DDoS attack, it includes a number of flows because IoT devices are targeted, so DRAM can hold the
capacity to manage the flows rather than CAM. To satisfy this characteristic, the key-value store is
used to manage IP-based 4-tuple on an FPGA, while ASIC-based CAM can hold the same capacity
with FPGA’s internal RAM but it is expensive.
5.3 mitiKV Architecture
The mitiKV is a hardware-based, autonomous, inline DDoS mitigation system, which generates
DDoS rule automatically and prevents them. Figure 5.1 shows the overview of mitiKV on a provider
network. The attacker sends DNS queries to amplify the response packet size, then DNS open re-
solvers reply to victim servers. Since an AS pays the connection fee with the peered AS according
to the volume of tra c, it is a critical challenge to reduce DDoS tra c. Thus, mitiKV is located
in front of the customer AS to prevent DDoS packets and identifies the DDoS tra c and generate
4-tuple rules for the filtering automatically. Section 5.3.1 proposes a novel DDoS detection scheme
with protocol behavior by using an ICMP error message, and Section 5.3.4 then provides hardware
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design. DDoS defense mechanisms can be characterized with three features: activity level, coop-
eration degree, and deployment location [75]. The proposed mitiKV is discussed in terms of these
features below.
• Activity level: mitiKV is reactive and pattern matching based detection mechanism. mitiKV
achieves high speed detection and prevention by focusing on DNS amplification attack.
• Cooperation degree: mitiKV does not need any other tra c measurement or filtering sys-
tems. mitiKV performs DDoS attack detection and filtering with dedicated hardware. Besides,
multiple mitiKV boxes installed on multiple customers’ links work autonomously.
• Deployment location: mitiKV is located on a transit link which is connected to other net-
works. It protects a link connected to a customer network against DDoS attack.
In this manner, mitiKV works as an inline DDoS mitigator on customers’ links to protect cus-
tomer servers against DNS-based amplification attack.
5.3.1 DDoS Detection by ICMP Behavior
The key idea of the DNS-based amplification attack detection mechanism of mitiKV is leveraging
one of the most basic mechanisms of the Internet, ICMP Port Unreachable message. Since ICMP
port unreachable packet has 64 bytes of the original datagram’s data [86], DNS-based amplification
attack can be identified by checking ICMP port unreachable message on customers’ links.
The detection sequence is shown in Figure 5.2 and is explained below. Figure 5.3 shows the state
machine to manage 4-tuple state discussed below.
1. DNS Query: An attacker sends a DNS query to a DNS open resolver. The attacker spoofs its
source IP address as victim host’s IP address.
2. DNS Response: The DNS open resolver receives the query and replies to the spoofed source
IP address to the victim host via a transit link. mitiKV learns 4-tuple that consists of source IP
address, destination IP address, source UDP port number and destination UDP port number.
mitiKV updates the state of flow into Suspected.
3. ICMP Port Unreachable Meassage: The victim host receives the unexpected DNS response
packet and replies ICMP port unreachable message including the DNS response packet on its
payload. mitiKV updates the state of 4-tuple into Filtered and decides this as DDoS attack.
4. DNS Query: Repeating steps 1 and 2.
5. DNS Response: The DNS open resolver replies against spoofed queries, but mitiKV already
learned the 4-tuple and recognized that these packets were related to the DDoS attack. Thus,
mitiKV discards the packets.
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Figure 5.2: The detection sequence of mitiKV.
By this method, mitiKV can detect certain DNS-based amplification attack and prevent them
immediately. Because this method relies on ICMP messages, if they are perfectly filtered by firewalls
between any victim and amplifier hosts, the proposed method does not work. Please note that it is
assumed that amplifiers are distributed across ASes. In this case, the proposed method can reduce
DDoS tra c if network paths where ICMP port unreachable message can go through exist between
ASes.
5.3.2 Hash Table Size Managed on mitiKV
Hash table size is the critical factor in terms of mitigating the DDoS attack. DDoS attackers may
spoof multiple source IP addresses. In this case, the number of combinations of source IP addresses
and source UDP port numbers that query packets include is important to mitigate the DDoS attack.
Thus, hash table size whether howmany key-value pairs to be stored should be determined depending
on the expected number of flows, and key conflicts should be handled.
The hash table size is limited by a physical hardware capacity in which an FPGA has limitations
of an external memory module [25]. A simulator, written in C, of mitiKV behavior was built to
evaluate hash table sizes and the number of mitigated packets. This simulator performs hash calcu-
lation by the combination of source IP address, destination IP address, source UDP port number, and
destination UDP port number. Then, a hash table entry indexed by the calculated hash value is ac-
cessed. Finally, hit ratio is calculated from this procedure. Note that hit means that the pointed hash
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Figure 5.3: State machine of mitiKV that manages 4-tuple.
table entry can be inserted without overwriting a key-value pair which has already been registered.
A compulsory miss is counted as hit.
Here, a simple incremental pattern was used as data pattern, where combinations of destination
UDP port and source IP address are incremented for each query. Hash functions used are CRC32 and
lookup3 of Jenkins hash. CRC32 is often implemented as dedicated hardware for calculating frame
check sequence on Ethernet MAC. Jenkins hash is often used in a hardware design of key-value
store [10].
Figure 5.4 shows simulation results when hash table size is 1k and 262k entries using CRC32
and Jenkins hash to calculate hash table index, respectively. The x-axis denotes the number of com-
binations of amplifiers’ source IP addresses and destination UDP port numbers. Y-axis denotes the
hit ratio of packets which are mitigated by mitiKV. In 1k table size, mitiKV cannot mitigate these
packets related to DDoS attacks when the number of combinations is over 600 on CRC32. In 262k
hash table size, mitiKV cannot mitigate packets when the number of combinations is over 500,000.
In Jenkins hash, higher hit ratio than the ratio of CRC32 is observed. When the number of com-
binations is 1,000, the hit ratio is 38%. This result implies that hash table is used e ciently when
Jenkins hash is adopted, compared with CRC32. Thus, we have to choose hash table size carefully
taking expected tra c amounts and network interface of transit link into consideration. It is required
to further investigate the hashing system including the hash function to obtain the higher hit ratio on
mitiKV.
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Figure 5.4: Simulation result on CRC32 and lookup3.
5.3.3 Rule Management on Hardware-based Key-value Store
Hardware-based key-value store is used as rule management for decision of all packets to pass-
through or to be discarded.
The key-value store was optimized to meet the required network middlebox as described in the
following. The assumed data structure is the 4-tuple flow label as the key, which is comprised of
source IP address, destination IP address, source UDP port number and destination UDP port number
and an expiry time as the value as shown in Figure 5.5. In this context for a network middlebox, since
key length and value length are fixed size, we can reduce the number of lookup to tables (e.g., hash
table and bucket list).
Key-value store and hash table are looked up at the expense of the wildcard. We can also think
the number of tuples for each flow label n can be smaller than 4 to achieve e ciency of table size.
We introduce trade-o↵s from a real Internet tra c, which lead to errors when adopting n-tuple-base.
We explain each tuple attributes at the receiver of DDoS tra c as described in the following.
• 4-tuple {Source IP address, Destination IP address, Source UDP port number, Destina-
tion UDP port number}
Although the 4-tuple flow level attributes can specify a fine-grained UDP-based flows, the at-
tack with randomized port is not absorbed due to limitation of rules generated by 4-tuple. It
takes time until the mitigator learns all the flows. On the other hand, mitigator decides the
action by 4-tuple flow, so false positives are reduced.
• 3-tuple {Source IP address, Destination IP address, Source UDP port number}
Some attackers use randomized destination port numbers against victim hosts. Since the num-
ber of tuples can be aggregated due to the lack of destination UDP port, the number of stored
entries can be reduced and mitigator uses memory more e ciently. The attack by concerned
protocol is mitigated between specified hosts regardless of randomized ports.
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Figure 5.5: Hash table design on mitiKV.
• 2-tuple {Source IP address, Destination IP address}
The mitigator recognizes that the tra c from source IP host to destination IP host is perfectly
malicious and mitigated tra c. Instead, false positives increase.
• 1-tuple {Source IP address}
The mitigator recognizes that the tra c from the host with the concerned source IP address is
perfectly malicious. The key size is only 4B, so store space is e↵ectively used and has more
entries than any n-tuple key. However, the detection by a single ICMP packet leads filtering
tra c from the host even though the host sends legitimate tra c.
Since the constraints of memory capacity a↵ect the hit ratio, the e ciency of memory capacity
is critical. When hash collision occurs, the entry is updated to a new key if an expired time is
invalidated. Otherwise a new key is ignored.
This chapter focuses only on 4-tuple base data structure. Since key-value store uses a hash
function to look up the hash table, the number of the rule entries and the hit ratio of hash collision
are important design parameters.
5.3.4 Hardware Design
Figure 5.6 shows the proposed mitiKV architecture overveiw. mitiKV consists of the following
modules.
• DDoS Attack Filter module : This module monitors all packets to filter the packets related
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Figure 5.6: mitiKV architecture.
to suspected DDoS attacks. When DDoS attack packets are filtered, the module creates a
tuple which will be processed in database Lookup/Insert module. In the prototype FPGA
implementation, we assume DNS-based amplification attack as attack tra c in Section 5.3.5.
In this case, DNS response packets whose source UDP port number is 53 are filtered.
• ICMP Filter module : This module monitors all packets whether packets with ICMP port
unreachable and an error packet over the ICMP matched with DDoS suspected packet as men-
tioned in Section 5.3.1. When packets are filtered, this module sends a query to database to
lookup state and then checks whether the packet is suspected DDoS attack or not.
• Database Lookup/Insert module : This module provides two interfaces, READ and WRITE
interfaces to manage key-value store for flows and their states. The DDoS Attack Filter module
and ICMP Filter module access this module to check the 4-tuple flow whether DDoS attack
or to update the state. This database is managed by hardware-based key-value store on the
memory module.
• System Counter : This module is a counter module generating timestamp for expiring logic.
The timestamp in value field is checked if time is expired when database module accesses each
key-value entry.
An external memory is used as the hash table as shown in Figure 5.6. The hash table can be
implemented on DRAM, SRAM, and internal FPGA memory. While SRAM and internal FPGA
memory modules has constant access latency, DRAM has dynamic access latency. The di↵erence
of these access latencies is hidden by implementing a pipeline deeply in which the number of stages
is equivalent to the access latency. On the other hand, the memory size will be a crucial factor to
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mitigate attack tra c. To mitigate abusing tra c, the hash table needs to be larger than the size
which is capable of storing the number of abusing flows in a period. The hash table size and hit ratio
on the hash table is the key component of this approach. They were described in Section 5.3.2.
Figure 5.5 shows hash table design on mitiKV. Each entry consists of key and value. Key is
the 12B fixed length and consists of IPv4 source address, IPv4 destination address, source UDP port
number and destination UDP port number. Value is 4B fixed length and consists of status, flag and
expiring time. The index is calculated by hash function to retrieve the key. The key retrieved from
the hash table is compared with the requested key to see if both the requested key and the key from
the hash table are identical. Status field is used to identify a suspicious or a filtered flow. Flag field
is used for validation of data, which utilizes 1 bit and the other bits are reserved. This validation bit
implies that data has been stored. If validation bit is set to 1 and expiry time is expired, this entry
becomes invalidation and can store a coming flow.
The expiry time is used to validate filtering rules. According to the investigation of UDP-based
amplification DDoS attack [87], the 99-percentile duration is 130.52 minutes. Thus, it is su cient
for 16bit time counter with a second resolution in mitiKV as shown in Figure 5.5. Expired key-value
pairs are deleted when the hash table entry is read. Expiry time can be set an arbitrary value by an
operator. Operators can use 130 minutes or more based on past rule of thumb above. Since DDoS
trend and attack condition would change, network operators carefully choose the expiry time, which
a↵ects the communication after recovering from hijacking.
When hash table is fully utilized, a new entry will be added, depending on status field and expiry
field. When the status field of an entry is suspicious, a new entry can be replaced. When the status is
filtered, adding a new entry is depending on the expiry field. If the expiry time exceeds, a new entry
can be replaced.
5.3.5 An FPGA Implementation
This section illustrates a prototype of the proposed mitiKV. The proposed mitiKV is implemented
on Digilent NetFPGA-SUME board [9, 27]. An FPGA device used is Xilinx Virtex-7 XC7V690T
FFG1761-3. The board has four 10GbE interfaces for communication. Design tool used is Xilinx
Vivado 2015.4.
The proposed mitiKV module uses Advanced eXtensible Interface (AXI) Stream 1 as data bus
interface. 10G Ethernet Subsystem IP is used as a 10G MAC. The data width is 64bit. This imple-
mentation is based on AXI Stream data bus interface.
Integrating CPU into our implementation can provide configurations, statistical information and
manual managing of rules on key-value store via a user interface on UART. A soft-macro CPU was
not implemented for system configuration for the sake of simplicity.
The key-value store was implemented on BRAMs. The number of hash table entries is 1k and
1AXI is a family of microcontroller buses by ARM AMBA.
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Table 5.1: Synthesis results.
Hash Table Entry Size 1k 262k
Slice Utilization [%] 4.17 6.21
BRAM Utilization [%] 1.63 64.73
262k to store filtering rules. From the viewpoint of hardware implementation, while CRC32 can
be calculated by a single clock cycle, Jenkins hash can be calculated in 6 clock cycles [10], which
need 6 steps data pipeline to conceal the latency. Hence, as a hash function, CRC32 was chosen
for simplicity. If more capacity for storing rules is required, an external memory such as SRAM or
DRAM is also available to store them. As mentioned above, constant access latency for SRAM and
dynamic access latency for DRAM are hidden by implementing a deep pipeline. In the evaluation,
the BRAM-based mitiKV is used.
Specifically, 10GbE requires running at more than 156.25MHz when AXI stream data width
is 64bit. Table 5.1 shows the synthesis report of mitiKV per table size. The hash table sizes we
implemented are 1k and 262k sizes. We implemented 262k size hash table, which is the maximum
size of single Dual Port RAM IP in the targeted FPGA. The BRAM utilization is 64.73%. In case
more hash table space is needed, an external RAM such as SRAM and DRAM can be replaced with
BRAMs. Since the slice utilization indicates that mitiKV core is so small compared to the overall
FPGA’s area, the mitiKV core can be also embedded in other hardware-based network appliances.
5.4 Evaluations
This section provides feasibility in terms of two aspects: Can ICMP port unreachable message be
used for DDoS attack detection? and Can mitiKV defense DDoS attack even on the Internet back-
bone? Section 5.4.1 analyzes the Internet tra c to provide the answer to the first question. To answer
the second question, Section 5.4.2 provides the hardware test to show mitigation performance under
the simple environment, and then Section 5.4.3 provides mitigation capability under the Internet
tra c. Section 5.4.4 provides results of completion time for DDoS attack.
5.4.1 ICMP Port Unreachable Message
The proposed method in this section, heavily relies on the message encoded by the network stack
of the victim hosts. Therefore understanding how the ICMP destination unreachable message is
observed at a transit link is important since some implementations may not embed the original packet
information which triggers port unreachable message, some middleboxes may strip the packet or just
simply filtered out. The standard says If a higher level protocol uses port numbers, they are assumed
to be in the first 64 data bits of the original datagram’s data. [86], which is interpreted as 28 bytes
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Figure 5.7: Number of IP address pairs among 1) all of observed ICMP port unreachable messages,
and 2) 1) with DNS packet in the payload.
in IPv4 (i.e., 20 bytes IP header and 8 bytes higher protocol datagram) of the original packet is in the
payload. In the IPv6 standard [88] it specifies di↵erently with 1,280 bytes payload at the maximum
size.
This section investigates the availability of the key information for our proposed method by
analyzing the public packet trace at educational backbone network. In summary, the ICMP port
unreachable messages we observed fulfill our expectation to detect UDP-based amplification attack.
The detail will be discussed in the following description.
5.4.1.1 Dataset
We used tra c traces from MAWI (Measurement and Analysis on the WIDE Internet) archive sam-
plepoints F [89] in July 2016 (i.e., 31 days). The archive includes 15 minutes daily packet trace at
the transit link of the backbone network, with anonymized IP addresses in the traces.
Although the tra c trace only recorded a short duration in a day as well as with partial length
(first 96 octets) of packets, it contains enough information of what we are investigating here —we
only need the payload of IPv4 ICMP destination unreachable message and the trend of ICMP mes-
sage, not the full number of messages exchanged, to justify how the proposed method is practical in
the wild.
We focus on the number of source and destination pairs of IP addresses in the trace which 1)
have ICMP destination port unreachable (type 3 code 3) messages, 2) 1) with DNS packet (port
53 of UDP packet) in the payload. In addition to that, we counted the distribution of packet size
which each packet contains ICMP destination unreachable message to study how the network stack
implementation encodes the original packet when it sends back the error.
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Figure 5.8: Cumulative distribution of the packet size in the ICMP destination error message, which
indicates the existence of the original packet to identify it is DNS packet or not.
5.4.1.2 Results
Figure 5.7 shows the number of observed flows in the packet traces which contains the ICMP desti-
nation unreachable messages and payloads which the original packets were DNS packets. Figure 5.8
plots the distribution of packet size among all of ICMP port unreachable messages.
As shown in Figure 5.7, there are a number of ICMP port unreachable messages which the
original packets are DNS-related (query or response). Also Figure 5.8 represents that the minimum
packet size of the original packet is 28 bytes2, which can contain the port number of UDP to identify
if the packet is DNS or not.
Above information confirms that there are su cient information to identify the packet under
suspicious by our proposed method based on the ICMP port unreachable messages.
5.4.2 Mitigation Test under DDoS Tra c
This section shows the capability of DDoS prevention. mitiKV is tested to see whether it can detect
and prevent DDoS tra c. We use the implementation with 262k hash table entries as described in
Section 5.3.5. Hash table hit ratio in Section 5.3.2 was simulated, so that this hardware should be
able to prevent up to around 200k without misses on the hash table.
5.4.2.1 Hardware Environment
Figure 5.9 shows an evaluation environment. Each component is explained as follows, except mkv.
Table 5.2 shows specification of each component on measurement environment.
2The minimum packet size 56 bytes of ICMP unreachable message can be interpreted as 28 bytes the original packet
since the size of IPv4 header is 20 bytes and the size of ICMP Destination Unreachable Message without the Original
datagram is 8 bytes.
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Figure 5.9: Evaluation envrionment.
(a) FPGA-based Attacker Emulator : Attacker emulator generates packets related to DNS am-
plifier attack. More specifically, it generates DNS response packets with response bit by chang-
ing the combinations of source IP address and destination UDP port number and sends them to
the victim host via mitiKV in 10Gbps line rate. Therefore, packets are generated against mul-
tiple destination UDP port numbers from UDP port number 53. In Section 5.4.3, OSNT [90]
is used on NetFPGA-SUME card instead of VC709 card.
(b) FPGA-based TAP device : In order to measure packets per second (pps) between mitiKV and
the victim host, the FPGA-based TAP device is installed. The TAP device has four Ethernet
ports. Two ports are bridging: port0 is connected to mitiKV, and port1 is connected to the
victim host. Remaining two ports are connected to (c) tra c analyzer for mirroring of inbound
and outbound tra c.
(c) Tra c Analyzer : The tra c analyzer measures packets per second frommitigator’s outbound
port and victim host’s inbound port. This analyzer performs tcpdump for capturing a large
number of packets to measure packets per second in two 10GbE ports: victim host’s RX and
TX ports. A RAM disk is used as storage to store captured pcap files in consideration of
storage throughput. The number of packets per 10 ms from the captured files are analyzed.
(d) Victim Host : It is assumed that victim host is a general Linux machine.
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Table 5.2: Components of measurement environment.
Hardware OS NIC + Driver Main memory
(a) Xilinx VC709 — — —
(b) Xilinx VC709 — — —
(c) Intel Core i5-4590 FreeBSD 10.2R Intel X520-DA2 + ixgbe 2.8.3 4GB
(d) Intel Core i7-4770 Fedora 24 (Linux 4.6.6) Intel X520-DA2 + ixgbe 4.2.1 32GB
5.4.2.2 ICMP Kernel Tuning
A general Linux machine is set as rate limit parameter that defines a packet per one second against
one host. Since the mitiKV is located at transit link of network service provider, mitiKV needs to
observe all packets in the located network and the connected network. To evaluate mitiKV hardware,
the Linux machine denoted in (d) is required to emulate multiple victim hosts located in the connected
network. Kernel parameters for ICMP on the victim host were configured for emulating multiple
victim hosts temporarily. A Linux host returns an ICMP packet with a port unreachable message
per one second against one remote host in an environment with default kernel parameters. Here, the
following parameters were tuned as returned packets per one second.
• /proc/sys/net/ipv4/icmp_ratelimit : 0
• /proc/sys/net/ipv4/icmp_msgs_per_sec : 14880000
• /proc/sys/net/ipv4/icmp_msgs_burst : 25600
In default, Linux host has parameters of rate limiting on ICMP packets. The parameter icmp_ratelimit
controls the maximal rate of sending ICMP packets and can be disabled by setting 0. The param-
eter icmp_msgs_per_sec defines the maximal number of ICMP packets from a host. To emulate
multiple victims at a single host in the experiments, the machine was tuned to return the ICMP
packets at 10GbE line rate because the rate of short packet (64B) is 14.88Mpps. The parameter
icmp_msgs_burst can set the burst size of ICMP packets.
5.4.2.3 Results
Figure 5.10 shows the result of DDoS attack to a victim host as shown in Figure 5.9. FPGA-based
Attacker Emulator generates DDoS attack tra c which includes 1,000 flows— amplified tra c from
DNS server to a victim host (incremental 1,000 destination UDP port numbers, which are equivalent
to 1,000 source UDP port numbers from an attacker). This measurement is performed on (c) tra c
analyzer. Received packets from two network interfaces on the tra c analyzer machine represent the
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Figure 5.10: DDoS attacking test against a victim host with incremental 1,000 destination UDP port
numbers.
Table 5.3: Components of measurement environment.
Hardware OS NIC + Driver Main memory
(a) Intel Xeon E5-2637 Ubuntu 16.04 LTS NetFPGA-SUME + sume_ri↵a 1.34 512GB
(b) NetFPGA-SUME — — —
(c) Intel Core i7-6700K Ubuntu 16.04 LTS Intel X520 + ixgbe 5.3.5 64GB
(d) Intel Core i5-3450S Fedora 24 Intel X520 + ixgbe 4.2.1 8GB
number of DDoS attack packets and ICMP port unreachable messages, respectively. The figure in-
dicates that the proposed detection method takes time to learn all DDoS flows. Specifically, we need
1,000 DNS packets and 1,000 ICMP port unreachable messages to generate rules for 1,000 flows, but
we need to consider round trip time between mitiKV and a victim host. In this time, a victim host re-
ceives DDoS packets because mitiKV does not complete generating rules until receiving ICMP port
unreachable messages on mitiKV. Although the latency between victim host and mitiKV is small due
to the back-to-back connection in this evaluation, the millisecond level latency to achieve ICMP port
unreachble messages to the mitiKV occurs due to network devices in the practical case. Figure 5.10
indicates that dropping packets in a first second mean packets to pass through mitiKV until filetering
rules are generated. After completing to generate rules, packets are perfectly filtered by mitiKV. The
learning time is depending on the round trip time between mitiKV and a victim host. In this case, the
victim may receive more attacks in a period of learning flows on the mitiKV because it takes more
time to learn DDoS flows.
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5.4.3 Mitigation Test under DDoS Tra c with the Internet Backbone Tra c
In this section, we try to understand the behavior of mitigation against the real world tra c. To
examine it, a trace was created by combining tra c data and pseudo-DDoS tra c, which is DNS
amplified packets with 1,036 bytes as packet size, including 1,000 flows. We use SINET5 [91]
backbone tra c as of 18th November 2015 and extracted 1M packets and concatenated it with DDoS
amplified tra c which we prepared. In the extracted tra c, average packet size is 688.74 bytes and
average throughput is set to 2,038 kpps.
For this experiment, almost the same environment in Figure 5.9 is used, but replaced FPGA-
based Attacker Emulator with OSNT [90] on NetFPGA-SUME to replay the tra c file we created.
Table 5.3 shows the environment used in this experiment. In tra c analyzer, tcpdump was performed
to capture packets on RAM disk. Note that, in this experiment, since the purpose is not throughput
measurement but confirming protocol behavior and mitigation test under the Internet backbone traf-
fic, the inter packet delay was set to 10µs on OSNT to capture them without packet loss due to capture
machine’s performance.
To confirm the e↵ectiveness of mitiKV, two trials were examined: 1) tra c replaying with mi-
tiKV and 2) tra c replaying without mitiKV. In Figure 5.11, while the tra c with mitiKV is cleaned
up after mitigation by mitiKV, the tra c without mitiKV shows the tra c including DDoS attacks.
We used pcap file including 1,010,000 packets and repeated the tra c file 10 times with OSNT, so we
generated 10,100,000 packets in total: 10,000,000 packets as normal and 100,000 packets as DDoS.
In the tra c without mitiKV, 10,100,000 packets were captured. When we used mitiKV and tried
this experiment five times, 1145.2 DDoS packets on average (standard deviation is 15.6) were passed
through mitiKV for learning the DDoS flows by detecting ICMP port unreachable messages. In this
case, 98,854.8 DDoS packets of 100,000 DDoS packets were reduced on average. That is, in this
setup, the mitigator reduced 98.8% DDoS packets in total when mitiKV is used with the real Internet
tra c. Tra c before cleaning up is the almost constant packet rate at 100kpps. In contrast, mitigated
tra c shows a periodical wave because we added DDoS tra c in the tail of the regular backbone
tra c and repeated replaying the concatenated tra c file.
Thus, mitiKV can prevent DDoS attacks drastically under the Internet backbone tra c. In this
case, 100,000 DDoS packets which include 1,000 flows were used. Current BRAM-based mitiKV
can hold 262k flows, which can mitigate less than 262k flow attacks. For the recent trending attacks,
we can expect a longer duration for DDoS attack and a number of flows for DDoS. In such cases,
mitiKV can also utilize external memory as the key-value store, sacrificing its access latency.
5.4.4 Mitigation Completion Time and Rate
DDoS tra c is generated with Namp = 512, 1k, 2k, 4k, 8k, 16k and 32k. The completion time
depends on Round Trip Time (RTT) between a victim host and amplifiers, and detection scheme,
which we use ICMP-based detection in this section. The number of targeted victims also a↵ects
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Figure 5.11: Mitigation test with extracted tra c of Internet backbone.
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(b) Multiple targeted victims emulation
Figure 5.12: The mitigation completion time in a local environment. FPGA-based attacker emu-
lator generates packets with Namp source IP addresses to one/multiple target(s). A victim host has
limitation of returning ICMP port unreachable messages. In the (a), we did not modify Linux kernel
related to ICMP. Thus, a victim host returns an ICMP error packet per 1ms. In the (b), we tuned
kernel parameters related to rate limiting of ICMP.
the completion time of mitigation due to the limitation of the response rate of ICMP error messages
by a victim host machine configuration. Thus, two scenarios were built using a single machine as
victim(s) in the following: 1) the single victim host and 2) multiple victim hosts. 1) uses default
Linux machine used as a victim host. 2) uses the same machine with 1) and tuned ICMP kernel
parameters. In this experiment, we use CAM-based mitigator to compare key-value store with CAM.
This CAM-based mitigator is implemented on the same FPGA board and uses the same detection
logic with mitiKV. Note that we use NetFPGA-SUME boards as (a) and (b) on Table 5.3, and replace
machines as (c) and (d) with machines that have Intel Core i7 series CPU. Victim host which is
denoted as (d) utilizes 64GB RAM.
In this experiment, the following two scenarios were assumed.
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Figure 5.13: The mitigation completion time in a local environment related to ICMP into one victim
host. Left figure shows the result when the target is a single victim host. Right figure shows the result
when the target is multiple victim hosts.
1. Namp amplifiers attack against a single targeted victim host in order to focus on performance
of a single node.
2. Namp amplifiers attack againstmultiple targeted victim hosts in order to observe entire pack-
ets filtering.
Figure 5.12 shows the result of generating DDoS tra c up to 8k of Namp. In the environment
(a) including a single targeted victim host, a single Linux based victim host returns ICMP port un-
reachable messages in the default speed of 1000 packets per second. Since the proposed mitigator
generates rules in the same speed by detecting ICMP port unreachable message and filters packets
which are triggered by the rule, the finished time depends on the number of source IP addresses.
In the environment (b) including multiple targeted victim hosts, victim hosts which are emulated
by setting Linux kernel parameters related to ICMP on a single linux machine, return ICMP error
messages without limiting the rate of ICMP error messages. Thus, instant mitigation was observed
in the (b) of Figure 5.12. In both environments, though DRAM-based mitigator completely achieves
to prevent packets after detection, CAM-based mitigator fails to prevent over 1k source IP addresses
because it has limited entries.
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Table 5.4: Scalability.
10GbE 40GbE 100GbE
Clock Frequency [MHz] 156.25 156.25 322.266
Data Width [bit] 64 256 512
DNS Reply Detection [clock cycles] 8 2 1
Hash Function (CRC32) [clock cycles] 1 1 1
KVS Processing [clock cycles] 2 2 2
Pipelining Depth 11 5 4
Figure 5.13 shows the result of completion time to have detected ICMP error messages and to
have mitigated DDoS tra c related to them. In the figure, x-axis denotes the number of source IP
addresses and y-axis denotes the completion time. As a result, while CAM-based mitigation has
not finished over 1k flows in both environments, KVS-based mitigation using DRAM has finished
depending on the rate of ICMP error packets.
5.5 Discussion
Scalability up to 100Gbps link
Transit links will be replaced with 40Gbps and 100Gbps high bandwidth link interfaces to pro-
vide network services to their customers. We investigated MAC IP specification provided by Xilinx
and calculated required clock cycles for a hardware-based pipeline. Table 5.4 shows the scalability
on 10GbE, 40GbE and 100GbE. To support 100GbE interface, high-end FPGA series are required to
implement mitiKV. It is a simple pipeline to design 40GbE and 100GbE because required clock cy-
cles related to packet parsing for detection of DNS response are reduced due to increasing data width
of MAC on 40GbE and 100GbE. To support high-speed interfaces such as 40GbE and 100GbE, a
custom FPGA board equipped with these interfaces is required. The mitiKV core design is applicable
to these interfaces.
Deployment level
It is assumed that mitiKV is placed in front of the customer AS on aspect of AS’s transit link. To
manage high volume tra c, DRAM implementation is not negligible. On the other hand, mitiKV
can be deployed on the various scale location. This mitiKV can also be e↵ective for the security to
locate in front of routers on home networks, o ce, and university by using proper memory module
including DRAM, SRAM, and BRAM.
False positive
ICMP port unreachable message is used for network diagnosis to confirm the port available or not.
Therefore, false positive may occur when network diagnosis is used. To avoid this false positive,
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expiry time for DDoS duration was introduced. Thus, network diagnosis may fail due to mitiKV’s
filtering.
Application to programmable switches
Programmable switches are emerging (e.g., Tofino [54]). The proposed scheme is suitable for match-
action tables to manage rules processed on the key-value store. Therefore, we are going on devel-
oping it for the programmable switch. However, the current model can utilize external SRAM chip.
We will also extend this architecture with larger external memory (e.g., DRAM).
5.5.1 Future Work
For the future work, this section summarizes three points.
Protocol supporting
While this chapter focuses on DNS protocol, mitiKV can support other protocols (e.g., NTP, SSDP
and memcached) by adding filters of the specific protocol and logic. Further research can explore
other protocol extension.
RTT and thoughput
This chapter described the middlebox design which is assumed to place on the Internet path. Thus,
this middlebox, mitiKV a↵ected network latency. So, extended evaluation is measuring RTT and
analized the impact of network sevices. Besides, the mitiKV can be evaluated whether mitiKV
processes at line speed accurately.
Implementation
In this implementation, the version with 262k bit BRAM has a negative slack, which means target
frequency was not matched. Some normal packets lost can be observed. Thus, the improvement
of the implementation would be performed using new generation FPGA (e.g., ultrascale+ FPGA in
Xilinx).
5.6 Summary
This chapter proposed a novel hardware-based DDoS mitigation system, called mitiKV, which fo-
cuses on DNS-based amplification attack. We focused on protocol behavior of the DNS-based am-
plification attack and the ICMP port unreachable message. The mitiKV detects and manages DDoS
attacks on hardware-based key-value store. This chapter analyzed real-world tra c and showed that
ICMP port unreachable messages have packet payload including required data for our protocol-based
approach. A prototype system was implemented on an FPGA board to show that mitiKV can mitigate
malicious tra c in 10GbE. Evaluation results demonstrated that mitiKV has capable of preventing
DDoS packets on the Internet tra c with DDoS attack. We discussed the scalability of the proposed
approach for further high throughput interfaces, such as 40GbE and 100GbE.
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Conclusions
6.1 Discussion
This dissertation proposed multi-layer key-value cache architecture using in-NIC and in-kernel caches,
which can improve the performance by increasing hit ratio on lower level caches. In this thesis, sim-
ulation results showed that a variety of design options can be adopted in the cases on the proposed
architecture.
This dissertation introduced the case for DDoS mitigation as an application of the proposed
architecture. A prototype of DDoS mitigation middlebox was developed with on-chip RAM of an
FPGA. While exteranl memory modules can be replaced with on-chip RAM and store more flows on
the memory in order to support massive DDoS tra c, latency increases on data plane due to memory
access latency to external memory modules.
In Chapter 4, level 0 cache which uses on-chip RAM of an FPGA to in-NIC cache, was intro-
duced. In this prototype, 1024 entries were developed as level 0 cache due to design limitation. More
entries can be expected in next generation FPGA technologies. Besides, two power management
shemes were introduced: host-based controller and in-NIC based controller. Realistic workload ex-
periments on the proposed implimentation using these power reduction schemes are important as
future work.
The proposed architecture can be applied to not only DDoS mitigation but also message queuing
system, real-time data streaming, domain name system, and so on. Note that it is important to have
temporal locality to enable the proposed architecture since lower level cache has small capacity.
Massive lower level cache capacity is expected to improve hit ratio on caches.
6.2 Concluding Remarks
In this dissertation, multi-layer key-value cache architecture using in-NIC cache and in-kernel caches
was studied in order to bridge the growth of networking and of CPU performance.
Networking equipment evolution has increased rapidly, resulting in the gap between network
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interface speed and CPU performance. Historically, cache hierarchy has been used in case we en-
counter the speed gap between CPU and memory. However, we have faced the gap between CPU and
network. Chapter 3 introduced the concept of the network-based multi-layer cache hierarchy, which
introduced in-NIC cache as the first level cache and in-kernel cache as the second level cache, and
the implementation of cache hierarchy organization on an open source platform. Simulations were
performed for the design options such as write policy, inclusive cache vs. non-inclusive cache and
eviction policy and so on. These results imply that this architecture is e↵ective for the gap mentioned
above.
Chapter 4 introduced the proposed architecture implemented on an FPGA equipped on NIC and
showed the architecture integrated with network datapath on NIC. Level 0 cache (on-chip RAM) is
introduced in in-NIC cache design to reduce DRAM latency and to improve in-NIC cache’s perfor-
mance. When the query is hit on the level 0 cache, the latency and the performance turned out to be
improved. Further, scheduling scheme for more energy e ciency was introduced in aspect of in-NIC
tra c measurement and power measurement in a host machine.
Chapter 5 applied the proposed FPGA architectur eapplied to DDoS mitigation, which is one
of the important Internet security issues. To detect DDoS flows quickly, an ICMP-based detection
was introduced. Tra c analysis results indicated a capability of the detection scheme on the Internet
backbone. In this chapter, hardware-based key-value store to mitigate DDoS tra c using an ICMP-
based detection scheme was introduced. A prototype system was developed using hardware-based
key-value store. Experiment results of DDoS testing in 10GbE line rate imply a capability of DDoS
mitigation. To protect a massive flows, external memory modules are expected to work. In this way,
it is expected that the proposed multi-layer key-value store could be applied for various applications.
The main contribution in this dissertation is exploring a variety of design space on multi-layer
key-value cache architecture: inclusive vs. non-inclusive cache, write-through vs. write-back, asso-
ciativities and eviction policies. In addition, in-NIC cache architecture combining on-board DRAM
and on-chip memory was designed and explored in terms of low latency, high throughput, and power
e ciency. As a result, it achieved higher performance than existing memcached design in terms of
the three metrics. The case for an application using in-NIC cache design showed DDoS security box
for DDoS mitigation system.
Possible future work is optimization of multi-layer key-value caches using in-NIC cache in the
context of in-network computing, since FPGA takes power consumption even when query work-
load is low. Thus, we will explore highly energy e cient system with in-NIC cache using proper
scheduling approach for the in-network computing.
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